‘Thank Goodness That’s Over’: The Evolutionary Story

Abstract

If, as the new tenseless theory of time maintains, there are no tensed facts, then why do our emotional lives seem to suggest that there are? This question originates with Prior's 'Thank Goodness That's Over' problem, and still presents a significant challenge to the new B-theory of time. We argue that this challenge has more dimensions to it than has been appreciated by those involved in the debate so far. We present an analysis of the challenge, showing the different questions that a B-theorist must answer in order to meet it. The debate has focused on the question of what is the object of my relief when an unpleasant experience is past. We outline the prevailing response to this question. The additional, and neglected, questions are, firstly -'Why does the same event elicit different emotional responses from us depending on whether it is in the past, present, or future?' And secondly -'Why do we care more about proximate future pain than about distant future pain?' We give B-theory answers to these questions, which appeal to evolutionary considerations.

Temporal Metaphysics in Z-Land

“…For the location of a temporal part of oneself relative to the unpleasant event has consequences for which actions it is appropriate for that temporal part to perform. A recent paper by Maclaurin and Dyke (2002) helps explain why one's attitudes are the appropriate ones. Maclaurin and Dyke point out that the new B-theorist must explain why it makes sense to adopt the ''thank goodness'' attitude only at times later than the unpleasant event.…”

Why Does Time Seem to Pass?

“…An object endures if it persists by strictly retaining its identity at each time, with no temporal parts, such that it exists in its entirety at each moment at which it exists; whereas an object perdures if it persists by having different parts at different times. 6 See for example the papers collected under the heading 'The Problem of our Experience of Time' in Oaklander and Smith 1994; see also Maclaurin andDyke 2002, Prosser 2006. not thereby seem to pass between up and down. In the absence of further argument it is not yet clear why time should be different.…”

“…On the strongest versions of intentionalism phenomenal characters and representational contents correlate uniquely across all subjects and possible worlds (see e.g. Dretske 1993, Tye 1995, 2002. In that case, whatever is represented by temporal passage phenomenology in subject S in world w is the same for us.…”

“…6 6 See for example the papers collected under the heading ‘The Problem of our Experience of Time’ in Oaklander and Smith 1994; see also Maclaurin and Dyke 2002, Prosser 2006. …”

Do we (seem to) perceive passage?

“…For some existing rejoinders to Prior's argument, see Mellor (1998, ch. 4), Maclaurin & Dyke (2002), Suhler & Callender (2012). See also Skow (2011) for further distinctions between different kinds of what he calls 'arguments from experience' for anti-reductionism.…”