Testing the Snake Head Strategy: Does Killing or Capturing Its Leaders Reduce a Terrorist Group's Activity?

How Does Leadership Decapitation Affect Violence? The Case of Drug Trafficking Organizations in Mexico

“…Jordan (2014) argues terrorist groups that are bureaucratically organized and have strong communal support are likely to survive leadership removal and retaliate. There is some evidence that religious terrorist groups increase violence after leaders are targeted (Mannes 2008). Finally, two studies find removal of criminal group leaders is associated with upticks in violence (Dickenson 2014;Guerrero Gutiérrez 2011a).…”

Counterterrorism Killings and Provisional IRA Bombings, 1970–1998

“…Larger brigades, in terms of membership, seem to have launched fewer overall IED events (models 2, 4, 6, 7) and fewer bombings against noncivilian targets (models [12][13][14]. This may be a result of PIRA's compartmentalization of roles and functions within these brigades.…”

“…Mannes' comparative study of leadership decapitation in 81 terrorist organizations showed that this policy rarely leads to a decrease in subsequent attacks in the following five-year period. 13 Mannes, however, also shows that in the case of religious terrorist organizations, attacks are likely to significantly increase following the targeted killing of its leader. LaFree et al found that three of the six high-profile British counterterrorist operations employed by the British government against PIRA resulted in a significant increase in subsequent terrorist attacks.…”

Dealing with uncertainty: the illusion of knowledge in the study of counterterrorism effectiveness

“…Jordan (2009) identifies terrorist groups' age, size and type as being crucial determinants for CT measures to be effective. Mannes (2008) similarly concludes that the success of a CT policy may depend on specifics and circumstances, including the ideology of groups. Price (2012) identifies organisational characteristics of terrorist groups as being critical to the effectiveness of decapitation strategies.…”

“…That said, we find a strong focus on a limited selection of policy measures that have attracted special attention in the academic world, due to either their recent increased use or their controversial nature. A good example here is targeted killings (also known as targeted assassinations) which have been extensively evaluated, both as a general policy (David 2002;Johnston 2012;Jordan 2009;Kaplan et al 2005;Kober 2007;Langdon, Sarapu, and Wells 2004;Mannes 2008;Price 2012;Wilner 2010) and in the form of drone warfare (Byman 2013;Cavallaro, Sonnenberg, and Knuckey 2012;Cronin 2013;Hudson, Owens, and Flannes 2011;Smith and Walsh 2013). Other measures have largely remained outside the scope of evaluations.…”