Testing for Offsetting Behavior and Adverse Recruitment Among Drivers of Airbag‐Equipped Vehicles

Harless, David W.; Hoffer, George E.

doi:10.1046/j.0022-4367.2003.00068.x

Cited by 19 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 33 publications

(53 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Studies of the effectiveness of vehicle safety features such as airbags and anti-lock brakes claim that improved standards have significantly reduced fatality rates (Farmer et al, 1997;Harless and Hoffer, 2003). Based on analysis of an insurance industry generated dataset, Peterson et al (1995), however, contend that increases in injury claims following the initiation of an airbag system is a result of offsetting behavior rather than a sorting of auto buyers.…”

Section: 22d Vehicle Safety Features and Vehicle Inspectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Other studies of the effectiveness of inspections and vehicle safety features such as airbags and antilock brakes have found little evidence of offsetting behavior and claim that improved standards have significantly reduced fatality rates (Loeb, 1990;Loeb and Gilad, 1984;Farmer et al, 1997;Harless and Hoffer, 2003).…”

Section: Merrell Et Al's (1999) Finding That Vehicle Safety Inspectimentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Traffic Fatalities and Economic Growth

Kopits¹,

Cropper²

2003

Policy Research Working Papers

214

218

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This dissertation adds to the current understanding of the socioeconomic determinants of traffic fatality rates by examining the variation in road deaths across countries and over time. Chapter two investigates the relationship between road safety and economic development within an Environmental Kuznets Curve framework. Reduced-form models of fatality risk as a function of per capita income are estimated using panel data for over 80 countries. The results confirm an inverted U-shaped relationship with income, with traffic fatality risk (fatalities per population) beginning to decline at incomes similar to those found for several environmental externalities. The turning point is driven by the rate of decline in fatalities per vehicle as income rises, since motorization rates (vehicles per population), while increasing with income at a decreasing rate, never decline with economic growth. This suggests that road safety improvements accompanying income growth depend on policies that reduce fatalities per vehicle rather than on reducing motorization.Projections suggest that the global road death toll will grow by 66% between 2000 and 2020 if historic trends continue. This number, however, reflects divergent rates of change in different parts of the world.Chapter three focuses on factors underlying the decline in fatalities per distance traveled, i.e., the downward sloping part of the road safety Kuznets curve.Formal models of traffic fatalities are developed for vehicle occupants and pedestrians. Reduced-form approximations to these models are estimated using panel data for over 30 high-income countries over 1964-2002. Estimates suggest that demographic changes and road building contributed to declines in both vehicle occupant and non-occupant fatality rates. In addition, increases in the size of the vehicle fleet, as predicted by theory, have increased occupant deaths while decreasing pedestrian deaths per distance driven.Improvements in medical care also played a role in reducing both fatality rates. The results do not offer evidence of a significant increase in demand for risky driving in response to newer, safer vehicles or seatbelt usage. The extent to which alcohol and increases in the elderly population have detrimental effects on fatality rates is found to be twice as large for pedestrians as for vehicle occupants.

show abstract

Section: 22d Vehicle Safety Features and Vehicle Inspectionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Merrell Et Al's (1999) Finding That Vehicle Safety Inspectimentioning

confidence: 99%

Traffic Fatalities and Economic Growth

Kopits¹,

Cropper²

2003

Policy Research Working Papers

214

218

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Following Peltzman (1975), the most commonly investigated phenomenon is road safety. Various studies have, for example, attempted to determine if adoption of new technologies such as airbags or antilock braking systems lead to a reduction in driver safety through increased speeds (see, e.g., Winston, et al (2006) and Harless and Ho¤er (2003)). Other papers empiri-3 Alternatively, one can think of sexual relationships that may result in a sexually transmitted disease (STD).…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Others have subsequently developed explicit behavioral models to investigate the implications of o¤setting behavior for a wide range of applications. A vast number of papers have also empirically investigated the prevalence and magnitude of o¤setting behavioral e¤ects (see Harless and Ho¤er (2003) and references therein). Our goal is to develop a theoretical approach that will provide insights into how the broad range of phenomena with o¤setting behavior should be modeled.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The value of technology improvements in games with externalities: A fresh look at offsetting behavior

Hoy

Polborn

2015

Journal of Public Economics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. We model this problem as a symmetric game in which each player's payoff depends on his own action and the average action of the other players, and analyze under which conditions an improved technology increases or decreases both the level of precautionary activity and equilibrium utility of players. For mandatory safety technologies, the direction of the welfare effect depends on whether the externality between players is positive or negative, and on whether the improved technology increases the individually optimal activity level, taking the activity of other players as given. For safety technologies that individuals can choose whether to employ, we show that an individual will generally expend too much on reducing the size of loss but, depending on conditions that we specify, either too much or too little on features that reduce the individual's probability of loss. Terms of use: Documents in

show abstract

“…1 For instance, Sen (2001) finds that Canadian mandatory seatbelt legislation did not reduce traffic fatalities by the predicted amount due to drivers offsetting some of the gains in safety from seatbelt usage by driving more aggressively. Harless and Hoffer (2003) show that the rise in personal injury claims after airbag adoption can be attributed to moral hazard and vehicle ownership pattern. They also find that rental car drivers are much more likely to commit grievous acts than other drivers.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%