Testing (beliefs about) social preferences: Evidence from an experimental coordination game

Chmura, Thorsten; Kube, Sebastian; Pitz, Thomas; Puppe, Clemens

doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2005.02.009

Cited by 21 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 7 publications

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“…Obviously, one needs to be cautious when generalizing from a laboratory experiment. Even though the evidence presented in Cleave et al (2013) and Falk et al (2013) suggests that the results from our sample may generalize to a more general population, 15 many of the decisions in the examples used to motivate our paper will be taken (i) by groups of individuals, (ii) whose members will have been selected through highly competitive processes and (iii) will have the power to act on behalf of others. All three factors have been shown to reduce other-regarding behavior (e.g., Charness and Sutter, 2012; Erkal et al, 2011; Hamman et al, 2010, respectively).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 85%

“…Despite this and the large literature on social preferences, there is only one study on how social concerns a¤ect equilibrium selection. Chmura et al (2005) examine how concerns for e¢ ciency and equality in the payo¤s of decision makers a¤ect choices in 2 2 coordination games. Unlike in our experiment, actions do not impose externalities on third parties.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Unlike in our experiment, actions do not impose externalities on third parties. Chmura et al (2005) …nd that concerns for equality and e¢ ciency are both important determinants of decisions in their coordination game.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Tacit Coordination in Games with Third-Party Externalities

Bland

Nikiforakis

2013

SSRN Journal

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When agents face coordination problems their choices often impose externalities on third parties. We investigate whether such externalities can a¤ect equilibrium selection in a series of one-shot coordination games varying the size and the sign of the externality. We …nd that third-party externalities have a limited e¤ect on decisions.A large majority of participants in the experiment are willing to take an action that increases their income slightly, even if doing so causes substantial inequalities and reductions in overall e¢ ciency. Individuals revealed to be other-regarding in a nonstrategic allocation task often behave as-if sel…sh when trying to coordinate.JEL codes: C90, D01, D03, D62, D63

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 85%

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

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Tacit Coordination in Games with Third-Party Externalities

Bland

Nikiforakis

2013

SSRN Journal

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“…There are only three different outcomes in the game, detailed in the left-hand side of the 2 The extent to which this preference explains the divergence between human decisions and standard gametheoretical predictions is the subject of a lively debate in experimental economics. For instance, lab experiments by Charness and Grosskopf (2001), Kritikos and Bolle (2001), Charness and Rabin (2002) and Engelmann and Strobel (2004) provide evidence against the inequality aversion hypothesis, while subsequent experiments by Chmura, Kube, Pitz, andPuppe (2005), Fehr, Naef, andSchmidt (2006), Bolton and Ockenfels (2006), Blanco, Engelmann, and Normann (2011), as well as a neuroeconomic study by Tricomi, Rangel, Camerer, and O'Doherty (2010), report evidence in its favor.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

What Drives Failure to Maximize Payoffs in the Lab? A Test of the Inequality Aversion Hypothesis

Jacquemet

Zylbersztejn

2011

SSRN Journal

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Experiments based on the Beard and Beil (1994) two-player coordination game robustly show that coordination failures arise as a result of two puzzling behaviors: (i) subjects are not willing to rely on others' self-interested maximization, and (ii) self-interested maximization is not ubiquitous. Such behavior is often considered to challenge the relevance of subgame perfectness as an equilibrium selection criterion, since weakly dominated strategies are actually used. We report on new experiments investigating whether inequality in payoffs between players, maintained in most lab implementations of this game, drives such behavior. Our data clearly show that the failure to maximize personal payoffs, as well as the fear that others might act this way, do not stem from inequality aversion. This result is robust to varying the saliency of decisions, repetition-based learning and cultural differences between France and Poland.

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“…Chmura et al (2005) investigate several 2x2 games with two equilibria. One of them is payoff dominant (or at least efficient, in the sense employed in our study), whereas the other gives the same payoff (225 points) to both players.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Does payoff equity facilitate coordination? A test of Schelling's conjecture

López-Pérez

Pintér

Kiss

2015

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Starting from Schelling (1960), several game theorists have conjectured that payoff equity might facilitate coordination in normal-form games with multiple equilibria -the more equitable equilibrium might be selected either because fairness makes it focal or because many individuals dislike payoff inequities, as abundant experimental evidence suggests. In this line, we propose a selection principle called Equity (EQ), which selects the equilibrium in pure strategies minimizing the difference between the highest and smallest payoff, if only one such equilibrium exists. Using a within-subjects experimental design, furthermore, we study the relative performance of the equity principle in six simple 2x2 coordination games.Overall, we find that Equity explains individual behavior better than a large range of alternative theories, including theories of bounded rationality and several other equilibrium selection principles. Further, a classification analysis suggests the existence of two main groups of players: (i) players who tend to play as Equity predicts, and (ii) a miscellaneous group of players who either go for the risk dominant equilibrium or act in a boundedly rational manner. This heterogeneity seems to be behind most of the coordination failures that we observe.Keywords: Coordination; equity; experiments; inequity aversion; level-k thinking; risk dominance.

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Testing (beliefs about) social preferences: Evidence from an experimental coordination game

Cited by 21 publications

References 7 publications

Tacit Coordination in Games with Third-Party Externalities

Tacit Coordination in Games with Third-Party Externalities

What Drives Failure to Maximize Payoffs in the Lab? A Test of the Inequality Aversion Hypothesis

Does payoff equity facilitate coordination? A test of Schelling's conjecture

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