Testing a rational choice model of “desistance:” Decomposing changing expectations and changing utilities

Abstract

We argue that a rational choice framework can be used to explain declines in offending from adolescence to young adulthood in two ways. First, subjective expectations of offending can be age graded such that perceptions of rewards decrease and perceptions of risks and costs increase. Second, the marginal (dis)utility of crime may be age graded (e.g., preferences for risks, costs, and rewards). We examine changes in offending from adolescence to young adulthood among a subset of individuals from the Pathways to Desistance Study (N = 585) and employ a nonlinear decomposition model to partition differences in offending attributable to changing subjective expectations (X) and changing marginal utilities (β). The results indicate that both have direct and independent effects on changes in offending over time. The results of a detailed decomposition on the subjective expectations also indicate that differences exist across the type of incentives. That is, the effect of changing expectations is attributed mainly to changes in perceived rewards (both social and intrinsic). Changing expectations of social costs and risk of arrest from offending have weak effects on changes in criminal behavior, which suggests that they must be accompanied by increases in the weight placed on these expectations to promote appreciable declines in offending.

Peers and offender decision‐making

“…Adolescents are more affected by peers in their risky decision‐making than are children or adults (Berndt, ; Blakemore & Mills, ; Gardner & Steinberg, ; Steinberg & Monahan, ). Researchers have shown that this age patterning in susceptibility to peer influence can be explained by heightened sensation seeking (i.e., risk preference; Steinberg et al., ), social reward‐sensitivity (i.e., social preference; Chein et al., ; Thomas & Vogel, ), and reliance on the “hot” affective system (i.e., time preference; Casey, Jones, & Hare, ; Cauffman et al., ) during adolescence, combined with immature capacities for self‐control (Steinberg et al., ). There is even an indication of within‐individual change in the type of social preferences, in that adolescents prioritize popularity goals over other social goals such as friendship and romantic involvement (LaFontana & Cillessen, ).…”

New Social Challenges And Crime Prevention In The Russian Federation

“…Criminal law norms, determining which socially dangerous acts are criminal, and establishing the types and amounts of punishments for their commission, thereby have a preventive effect on society as a whole. This effect is that citizens have a clear idea of certain actions as criminal, with the association in their minds of criminal punishment as an inevitable consequence of the crime (Thomas & Vogel, 2019;Thomas et al, 2020).…”

Social Bonding Experiences Facilitating Desistance in Adolescence

“…Overwhelmingly, research has focused on the process of desistance as occurring in adulthood (Craig et al, 2014; Giordano et al, 2002; Laub & Sampson, 2003; Thomas & Vogel, 2019). This focus reflects the established age-crime curve, where offending behavior increases through adolescence before declining substantially as one enters adulthood (Piquero et al, 2003).…”

“…Rational choice has been further operationalized within desistance research by considering social and personal rewards of criminal behavior against perceived risk of arrest using data from the Pathways to Desistance study. Perceived social costs of crime reduce offending behavior in adulthood, but not adolescence, while the social rewards of misbehavior significantly influence adolescent offending, but not young adult criminal behavior (Thomas & Vogel, 2019).…”

“…This level of perception reflects maturation through lived experiences, reflections on one’s past, and biopsychological change in adulthood (Rocque, 2015). Giordano and colleagues (2002) specified the sequence of cognitive transformations within desisting adults, and the recent application of rational choice arguments demonstrated risk and reward salience in young adulthood but not adolescence (Thomas & Vogel, 2019).…”