Terrorist Spectaculars: Backlash Attacks and the Focus of Intelligence

This overview examines critically the post-9/11 empirical literature on terrorism. Major contributions by both economists and political scientists are included. We focus on five main themes: the changing nature of terrorism, the organization of terrorist groups, the effectiveness of counterterrorism policies, modern drivers or causes of terrorism, and the economic consequences of terrorism. In so doing, we investigate a host of questions that include: How do terrorist groups attract and retain members? What determines the survival of terrorist groups? Is poverty a root cause of terrorism? What counterterrorism measures work best? In the latter regard, we find that many counterterrorism policies have unintended negative consequences owing to attack transference and terrorist backlash. This suggests the need for novel policies such as service provision to counter some terrorist groups’ efforts to provide such services. Despite terrorists’ concerted efforts to damage targeted countries’ economies, the empirical literature shows that terrorism has had little or no effect on economic growth or GDP except in small terrorism-plagued countries. At the sectoral level, terrorism can adversely affect tourism and foreign direct investment, but these effects are rather transient and create transference of activities to other sectors, thus cushioning the consequences. (JEL F21, F52, H56, K42, Z31)

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“…On backlash, seeArce and Sandler (2010),Dugan and Chenoweth (2012), Sandler (2004, 2010), andSiqueira and Sandler (2007).…”

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confidence: 99%

What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11

Gaibulloev

Sandler²

2019

Journal of Economic Literature

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157

126

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“…In this case, there were significant problems of moral hazard and adverse selection and the Condottieri often found it more profitable to attack the city that hired them, rather than that city's enemies. There is also a literature on asymmetric information games with terrorists (see e.g., Lapan and Sandler (1993) and Arce and Sandler (2007), Arce and Sandler (2010)). Salehyan (2010) uses a principal agent framework, though not a formal model, to examine the choice between attacking an enemy directly and indirectly through the support of insurgents operating in your enemy's country.…”

Section: Features Of the Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In their case, the probability of regime change increases with military subsidy and decreases with general aid, in our framework we focus on the destabilizing impact of direct intervention. Rosendorff and Sandler (2004) examine backlash or blowback effects of attacks on terrorists, on their recruitment and on general grievance (see also Arce and Sandler (2010)), Bloom (2010) and Jacobson and Kaplan (2007)). There is a substantial controversy over whether counterinsurgency warfare is best prosecuted by military means or trying to win "heart and minds" in order to lower population support for the terrorist group.…”

Section: Features Of the Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Military aid, direct intervention and counterterrorism

Garcia-Alonso

Levine

Smith

2016

European Journal of Political Economy

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We analyze the choice often faced by countries of whether to directly intervene to counter an external terrorist threat or to subsidize a foreign government to do it. We present a model which analyzes this policy choice where two countries, home and foreign, face a terrorist threat based in the foreign country. The home country chooses how much to invest in defending itself and in reducing terrorist resources either indirectly by subsidising the foreign country or by directly by intervening itself and risking destabilizing the foreign country. We use backward induction to solve a multiple stage game where the home country first commits to its policy decisions, then the foreign country chooses the effort it expends on reducing terrorist capability and finally, the terrorists decide their effort in attacking in the home or foreign country.Using a calibrated model, we are able to show that, for the chosen parameter values, direct intervention is only an equilibrium if foreign and home efforts are not good substitutes in the technology used to reduce the resources of the terrorist group. A higher relative military efficiency by the home country makes intervention more likely.JEL classification: D58, D74, H40.

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“…Current work is exploring behavior when the targets are valued differently by the attacker and defender, when multiple attackers or defenders need to coordinate their strategies, and when the decisionmakers are responsible not only for their own outcomes but for the outcomes of others (Arce et al 2010).…”

Section: Potential Future Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Terrorism experiments

Arce

Croson

Eckel

2011

Journal of Peace Research

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Experimental research has a long-established tradition in psychology and sociology, and a more recent but important history as a useful methodology in economics. In this article, we discuss the strengths and weaknesses of experiments as a method for studying terrorism and other national security topics. For example, given the paucity of data on counterterror policy decisions by governments, as well as for planning, targeting and selecting methods of attack by terrorist organizers, the experimental approach can substitute for this lack of field data. Experiments can also identify policy counterfactuals that might otherwise be unobservable. Hence, we begin by discussing several theoretical themes in the analysis of terrorism: interdependent security games such as airline screening; the dual nature of pre-emptive versus deterrent counterterror policies and the implications of this duality for policy coordination among targeted nations; the resurgence of interest in Colonel Blotto games when properly adjusted to reflect the asymmetric conflict between target governments and terrorist groups; and the relationship between terrorist activity and extreme punishments (or vendettas). The small but emerging literature using experiments to examine these issues is reviewed, paying particular attention to how experimental results can inform theory and policy. Finally, we propose new directions for researchers to explore.

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Terrorist Spectaculars: Backlash Attacks and the Focus of Intelligence

Cited by 36 publications

References 16 publications

What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11

What We Have Learned about Terrorism since 9/11

Military aid, direct intervention and counterterrorism

Terrorism experiments

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