Territorial Peace Without Territorial Governments: The Centralising Logic of the 2016 Colombian Peace Accord

Abstract

Colombia’s 2016 peace accord emphasises the concept of “territorial peace” but denies meaningful roles for territorial governments—a design decision that is especially puzzling given the recent prominence of local governments in peacebuilding initiatives around the world. This article argues that the pursuit of territorial peace without territorial governments can only be understood by broadening the temporal frame in ways that problematise the evolution of these governments over time. Decentralising reforms were at the heart of an earlier failed effort to end Colombia’s armed conflict in the 1980s and 1990s, leading both sides in the 2016 accord to draw different, but similarly negative, lessons about decentralisation. Guerrilla and government negotiators alike eschewed local governments but not for the reasons emphasised in the peacebuilding literature. Furthermore, Colombia’s earlier experience with decentralisation also exposed serious capacity deficits at the local level, raising questions about territorial governments as viable partners in building peace.

An Interactive and Cross-Temporal Framework to Explain Recentralisation

“…Reclaim of political authority for the national government. Reduction of the spaces for the representation of subnational polities (see Hooghe et al 2016;Eaton 2020). Reduction in the territorial representation of interest in national legislatures (see Hooghe et al 2016;Eaton 2020).…”

“…Reduction of the spaces for the representation of subnational polities (see Hooghe et al 2016;Eaton 2020). Reduction in the territorial representation of interest in national legislatures (see Hooghe et al 2016;Eaton 2020). Shift to concurrent from non-concurrent national and subnational elections.…”

“…In turn, political recentralisation refers to the set of formal and informal policies and reforms (particularly electoral) that reclaim political authority for the national government or reduce the spaces for the representation of subnational polities (see Hooghe et al 2016;Eaton 2020), for instance, a reduction in the territorial representation of interest in national legislatures, the shift to concurrent from non-concurrent national and subnational elections, and attempts to co-opt the direction of subnational governments' associations. 7 Probably, the clearest example of political recentralisation is the change in the election system of authorities of lower levels of government from democratic (direct) election to one in which the appointment or removal is controlled by a higher level of government (see Gel'man 2009).…”

“…They are not officially accountable to the population anymore, but to the higher level of government in charge of their appointment or removal. 8 The interdependence between the three types of recentralisation policies and reforms must be reaffirmed (see Montero and Samuels 2004;Eaton 2004). According to the approach of this book, the described reforms by Cardoso in Brazil were a clear case of recentralisation.…”

“…In this context, based on the seminal work of Rondinelli (1981) and Schneider (2003), extrapolating some elements of the notion of decentralisation developed by Falleti (2010) as well as building on the pioneer works on recentralisation by Eaton (2004) and Dickovick (2011), this book defines recentralisation as the set of formal and informal policies and reforms that transfer resources, authority or responsibilities from lower to higher levels of government, after a process of decentralisation. 1 This notion of recentralisation not only includes transfers from local or intermediate levels of government to national authorities, but also from local to intermediate levels.…”