Temporal Externalism, Deference, and Our Ordinary Linguistic Practice

Jackman, Henry

doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.2005.00232.x

Cited by 37 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 25 publications

(18 reference statements)

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“…In this section, I argue against two rival externalist metasemantic frameworks, each of which offers an alternative explanation of conceptual engineering in the narrow sense. The first is the 'worldly construal' of conceptual engineering given in Cappelen (2018); the second is the account of conceptual engineering offered in Ball (Forthcoming), inspired by temporal externalism as proposed and defended in Jackman (1999Jackman ( , 2005. I briefly look at each in turn.…”

Section: Topics and Linguistic Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

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Truth and objectivity in conceptual engineering

Sawyer¹

2020

Inquiry

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Recent examples of conceptual engineering within the philosophical arena include the proposal by Clark and Chalmers (1998) to extend the traditional understanding of belief, the proposal by Haslanger (2000) to rethink our conceptions of race and gender, and the proposal by Scharp (2013) to reconceive the notion of truth. But there is a good sense in which all philosophical theorizing is at root a form of conceptual engineering, and philosophical attempts throughout the ages to capture the nature of knowledge, evidence, causation, explanation, justice, rights, emotion, consciousness, and so on, count equally as examples. Moreover, examples of conceptual engineering can also be found beyond the confines of philosophy. Indeed, much of scientific theorizing falls under the umbrella of conceptual engineering, as do recent proposals in the social arena to overturn the traditional conceptions of, for example, rape, marriage, and women, where such proposals are largely driven by the desire for social justice and equality. Conceptual engineering has a long history and concerns a wide-ranging and diverse array of topics. Of late, philosophical attention has turned to the nature of conceptual engineering itself. What exactly is conceptual engineering? What unites the diverse array of cases? It will help to distinguish at the outset a broad sense of conceptual engineering from a narrow sense. In the broad sense, conceptual engineering is a form of theorizing that involves a proposed change in linguistic practice. Sometimes this can take the form of a proposal to eliminate the use of a term on the grounds that it is defective in some way, for example by failing to play the explanatory role it was intended to play (e.g. 'phlogiston', 'élan vital'); sometimes it can take the form of a proposal to introduce a new term on the grounds that it is required for explanatory purposes that have not hitherto been recognized (e.g. 'antimatter', 'epistemic entitlement'); and sometimes it can take the form of a proposal to keep a term that is currently in use, but to revise the current use on the grounds that this would constitute some kind of improvement, whether theoretical, practical or normative. Theorizing that involves a proposed change in linguistic practice of any of these kinds-elimination, introduction or revision-is conceptual engineering in the broad sense. But the paradigms of conceptual engineering around which recent debate concerning the nature of conceptual engineering has centred are to be found in that subset of cases that involve the revised use of a term. Each of

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Section: Topics and Linguistic Practicementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Cappelen 2018); and I make no mention of linguistic meaning so as to remain neutral with respect to the nature of linguistic meaning, including the question of whether the meaning of a term is determined by current linguistic practice, temporally-extended linguistic practice (cf. Jackman 1999Jackman , 2005 or something else.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Truth and objectivity in conceptual engineering

Sawyer¹

2020

Inquiry

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“…Since they ⁷ The general term for views on which the meaning of an expression or the content of a thought can depend on facts about later times is temporal externalism. For discussion and defence, see Jackman (1999Jackman ( , 2005; Ball (forthcoming).…”

Section: Timingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Revisionary Analysis without Meaning Change (Or, Could Women Be Analytically Oppressed?)

Ball¹

2020

Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics

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This chapter develops a conception of philosophical analysis which makes sense of the idea that a correct analysis can be revisionary (in that it departs from ordinary or expert belief and linguistic usage). The view is superior to the alternatives defended by most proponents of ‘conceptual ethics’ and ‘conceptual engineering’ (according to which revisionary theorizing involves replacing words or concepts) because it better explains the arguments we advance when we engage with proposed revisionary analyses. A key idea is that analytic claims can emerge in the course of debate without change of meaning, so that our acceptance (perhaps late in the debate) of some analyticity can fix the meaning of a word as we used it all along. The discussion focuses on Haslanger’s revisionary analysis of gender.

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“…The first potential objection to CIDA concerns whether ‘S’s dispositions to apply E given complete information’ picks out a determinate set of dispositions to apply E. To explore this objection, it is helpful to consider CIDA’s relation to the (in some respects) similar idea of temporal externalism . Temporal externalism is the view that ‘the future behavior of an individual or his society can affect the content of his thoughts and utterances’ (see Jackman 1999 , 2005 ). One way Jackman describes temporal externalism is to say that it involves deference to future experts (Jackman 2005 ).…”

Section: Zebrasmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Temporal externalism is the view that ‘the future behavior of an individual or his society can affect the content of his thoughts and utterances’ (see Jackman 1999 , 2005 ). One way Jackman describes temporal externalism is to say that it involves deference to future experts (Jackman 2005 ). This is a somewhat similar device to the idea of oneself and one’s first order dispositions given complete information; both the future expert and the counterfactual you have the benefit of knowing things which the actual current you does not.…”

Section: Zebrasmentioning

confidence: 99%

Zebras, Intransigence & Semantic Apocalypse: Problems for Dispositional Metasemantics

Andow

2016

Philosophia

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Complete information dispositional metasemantics says that our expressions get their meaning in virtue of what our dispositions to apply those terms would be given complete information. The view has recently been advanced and argued to have a number of attractive features. I argue that that it threatens to make the meanings of our words indeterminate and doesn’t do what it was that made a dispositional view attractive in the first place.

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Temporal Externalism, Deference, and Our Ordinary Linguistic Practice

Cited by 37 publications

References 25 publications

Truth and objectivity in conceptual engineering

Truth and objectivity in conceptual engineering

Revisionary Analysis without Meaning Change (Or, Could Women Be Analytically Oppressed?)

Zebras, Intransigence & Semantic Apocalypse: Problems for Dispositional Metasemantics

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