Telecommunications interception in Australia: Recent trends and regulatory prospects

Communication Interception Technology (CIT) and Its Use in the Fight against Transnational Organised Crime (TOC) in Australia: A Review of the Literature

“…Despite these claims however, they fail to detail the proposed model. Bronitt and Stellios (2005; also consistently raise concerns regarding the increasing use of interception technology by states and territories, rather than sole use by Federal agencies. What Bronitt and Stellios (2005; fail to acknowledge is that the growth of TOC is not limited to breaching only federal or state laws, indeed they are well known to exploit proposed restrictions (Irwin 2001).…”

“…Bronitt and Stellios (2005; also consistently raise concerns regarding the increasing use of interception technology by states and territories, rather than sole use by Federal agencies. What Bronitt and Stellios (2005; fail to acknowledge is that the growth of TOC is not limited to breaching only federal or state laws, indeed they are well known to exploit proposed restrictions (Irwin 2001). Providing all agencies with access to these methods is an integral part of the unification of Australian LEAs, a factor which is stressed as an essential requirement throughout the literature (Irwin, 2001;Glenn, Gordon & Florescu, 2008;Flood & Ratcliffe, 2008b;Gasper, 2009).…”

Regulating Telecommunications Interception and Access in the Twenty‐first Century: Technological Evolution or Legal Revolution? 1

“…3 This tendency to 'function creep' and 'normalisation of extraordinary powers' has been long recognised in the literature in this field. 4 From its inception as primarily an investigative tool for federal drug offences, the powers have evolved into a national surveillance scheme for serious crime whether federal or State. Indeed, the bulk of interception activity now relates to State offences.…”

“…In earlier work we have called for legislative reform that places rights protectionwhich extends beyond privacy to include fair trial rights-at the centre of regulatory design. 48 The response to such calls initially seemed promising, at least in respect of privacy. In his findings, Blunn said that 'the protection of privacy should continue to be a fundamental consideration in, and the starting point for, any legislation providing access to telecommunications for security and law enforcement'.…”

“…Indeed, there are arguments that the privacy interests become of greater rather than of lesser significance. 60 Recognising the need for privacy interests to be considered in all warrant applications, the 2006 amendments have removed the distinction between Class 1 and Class 2 offences, redefining existing offences under Classes 1 and 2 offences as 'serious offences' and applying privacy as a factor to be considered in all cases. These amendments were supported by the Senate Committee reviewing the Bill.…”