Technological development and political stability: Patenting in Latin America and the Caribbean

Institutional Outsiders and Insiders: The Response of Foreign and Domestic Inventors to the Quality of Intellectual Property Rights Protection

“…First, the region-bound country sample offers a natural laboratory for testing the impact of IPR quality on patenting because of the diversity in the adoption of the Paris Convention to improve the quality of IPR protection (Correa, 2000;Gadbaw and Richards, 1988;Watal, 1999). Finally, with few exceptions (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2007, 2008bDau, 2009a, 2009b;Cuervo-Cazurra and Stal, 2011;Dahlman and Frischtak, 1993;Guler and Guillén, 2010;Khoury and Peng, 2011;Khoury et al, 2012;Waguespack et al, 2005), there is a limited understanding of how institutions shape strategies within Latin America and the Caribbean (Nicholls-Nixon et al, 2011). Thus, IPR in particular for these developing countries has been an ongoing issue of international focus.…”

“…Developing countries, in contrast, are more likely to lack the resources to uphold stricter IPR protection and many greet the push to acquiesce their institutions toward more universal standards as more risky than beneficial to national interests (Sherwood, 1997). These limits to IPR protection have brought scholarly attention to the topic (Allred and Park, 2007;Chen and Puttitanum, 2005;Grossman, 2005;Hagedoorn, Cloodt, and van Kranenburg, 2004;Kumar, 1996;Khoury and Peng, 2011;Oxley, 1999;Park and Ginarte, 1997;Waguespack, Birnir, and Schroeder, 2005;Zhao, 2006). Governments of developing countries with higher quality IPR protection can benefit by achieving more progress toward fostering an environment that is favorable for firms to invest in innovation-based strategies (Khoury and Peng, 2011) and by signaling that the respect for IPRs is a recognized institutional priority, which fosters greater respect from inventors (Allred and Park, 2007;Sakakibara and Branstetter, 2001).…”

Exploring the use of patents in a weak institutional environment: The effects of innovation partnerships, firm ownership, and new management practices

“…Along the same lines, one arm of institutional theory (derived from economics) argues that firms behave according to the set of fundamental political, social and legal ground rules -also known as institutions -that "establish (…) the basis for production, exchange and distribution" (Davis and North, 1971, p. 6). Waguespack et al (2005), for example, have shown that political instability in countries adversely affects the patent behavior of local firms. This arm of institutional theory conjectures that firms respond to the institutional environment regardless of their ownership.…”

“…Thus, the recent surge in patenting may be particular to countries in which scientific and technological infrastructures are at the forefront. Firms operating in markets in which the judicial system does not favor patent enforcement may innovate without patenting due to the uncertain enforceability of their intellectual property rights (Bouet, 2015;Sarkissian, 2008;Waguespack et al, 2005). Innovation theory posits that patents are less useful in weak appropriability regimes (Teece, 1986).…”

Why Did Universities Start Patenting?

“…Also see Agres (2005), Washburn (2005), and Wysocki (2004). Work by scholarly non-specialists also still offhandedly attributes the post-1980 rise in university patenting to the legislation itself (see, for example, Debackere & Veugelers, 2005: 323;Tassey, 2005: 288;Waguespack et al, 2005Waguespack et al, : 1572, though usually with much less hyperbole. 5.…”