Technological Change, Campaign Spending and Polarization

Balart, Pau; Casas, Agustín; Troumpounis, Orestis

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3419670

Cited by 8 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 44 publications

(64 reference statements)

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“…For example, when inequality is high, the opportunity costs of activism for poorer (richer) segments of the electorate is substantially lower (higher). However, if the participation rates in partisan activism are much higher among the more affluent sections (with a greater cost elasticity), then this distortion could explain the increased partisanship and political polarization in the U.S. politics (see, e.g., Balart et al, 2018). These observations further suggests that any policy reform that decreases dependence on grassroots activism, like public funding of electoral campaigns, or campaign finance deregulation à la 2010 Citizens United v. FEC ruling, crowds out the demand for activism and increases polarization, in line with the predictions of my theoretical model.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Political activism and polarization

Venkatesh

2020

J Public Economic Theory

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I develop a model of activism and polarization in the context of electoral competition. Two candidates simultaneously announce policy platforms and seek the support of ideologically inclined activists. Activists compete to influence electoral outcomes by expending costly support for their respective candidates. The presence of activists always moderates the platform choice of candidates, compared to the case of no activism. The central finding of the paper is that the relationship between partisanship of activists and polarization is ambiguous. As activists become increasingly partisan, polarization of candidate platforms reduces or widens depending on the costs of activism. I present normative conditions under which the presence of activism and increased partisanship among activists are both welfare‐improving for voters. Finally, introducing a public funding option for candidates increases polarization in the political process.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For example,Balart, Casas, and Troumpounis (2018) study how changes in campaign technology affects contributions and electoral competition between candidates. 11 The distributional assumption helps clear analysis of the main trade-offs involved.…”

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confidence: 99%

Political activism and polarization

Venkatesh

2020

J Public Economic Theory

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“…Finally, Balart et al [34] study a spatial model of communication technology and advertising expenditure. In their model, candidates first choose platforms.…”

Section: Relevant Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure

Bizzotto¹,

Solow

2019

Games

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Recent developments in information and communication technologies allow candidates for office to engage in sophisticated messaging strategies to influence voter choice. We consider how access to different technologies influence the choice of policy platforms by candidates. We find that when candidates can target messages to specific voter groups, platforms are more likely to be inefficient. In particular, when candidates can run targeted campaigns, they commit to projects that benefit small groups even when the social cost of these projects outweigh their benefits. Our results are robust to negative advertising.

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“…The current paper also studies platform polarization, but suggests that the reason is that voters perceive valence and policy to some degree as complements. Ashworth and Bueno de Mesquita (2009) and Balart et al (2018) study endogenous investments in valence when increasing platform polarization shifts voters attention from valence to policy issues. In these papers the mechanism is not from valence to endogenous platform polarization but from platform polarization to endogenous valence.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Valence, complementarities, and political polarization

Denter

2021

Games and Economic Behavior

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I study a model of electoral competition where two parties that care about both the spoils of office and policy compete by announcing policy platforms. Parties are characterized by their valence on the one hand and by their policy platforms on the other. Unlike in the extant literature, I assume that valence and policy are complements (instead of substitutes) from the voter's perspective. I generally characterize electoral equilibrium and show that in such a framework increasing one or both parties' valence level(s) leads to policy moderation. To the contrary, if both candidates have minimal valence policy platforms are maximally polarized. The model hence uncovers valence as an important determinant of political polarization.

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Technological Change, Campaign Spending and Polarization

Cited by 8 publications

References 44 publications

Political activism and polarization

Political activism and polarization

Electoral Competition with Strategic Disclosure

Valence, complementarities, and political polarization

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