Techniques for assigning a target safety integrity level

Summers, Angela E.

doi:10.1016/s0019-0578(98)00010-x

Cited by 26 publications

(11 citation statements)

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“…The SIS consists of the instrumentation or controls installed for mitigating the hazard or bringing the process to a safe state in the event of a process upset. A SIS is used for any process in which the PHA has determined the insufficiency of the mechanical integrity of the process equipment, the process control, and other protective equipment to mitigate the potential hazard [98]. The features of a HAZOP study and the need to assign SIL for SIS revealed that the information obtained from HAZOP made it a serious candidate to use for linking its results with the input data required to start analyses for the SIL assignment; this situation now is being studied comprehensively.…”

Section: Assigning a Target Safety Integrity Levelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Summers [98] examined the six most common PHAs utilized throughout the process industries, highlighting the HAZOP study as the most interesting technique for functional safety requirements because it provided a prioritized basis for implementing risk-mitigation strategies. Five years later, she suggested that the features of LOPA offer a powerful, analytical tool for assessing the adequacy of protection layers to mitigate process risk [99]; again, HAZOP was deemed important in developing LOPA.…”

Section: Assigning a Target Safety Integrity Levelmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Hazard and operability (HAZOP) analysis. A literature review

Dunjó

Fthenakis

Vı́lchez

et al. 2010

Journal of Hazardous Materials

353

142

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Section: Assigning a Target Safety Integrity Levelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Assigning a Target Safety Integrity Levelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hazard and operability (HAZOP) analysis. A literature review

Dunjó

Fthenakis

Vı́lchez

et al. 2010

Journal of Hazardous Materials

353

142

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…W wyniku tej analizy firma uznała, że 65% tych zabezpieczeń jest przeinwestowanych. Jeden z powodów stosowania tak nieracjonalnie rozbudowanych systemów ochrony wymienia autor pracy [21]. Wskazuje on, że wiele firm, aby uniknąć problemów z zapewnieniem bezpieczeństwa, wprowadza zabezpieczenia o najwyższym poziomie pewności działania bez przeprowadzenia analizy ryzyka.…”

Section: Koncepcja I Główne Założenia Metodyunclassified

System obsługiwania pojazdów szynowych jako element w warstwowym modelu ich systemów bezpieczeństwa

Gill¹,

Kadziński²

2006

Pojazdy Szynowe

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W artykule przedstawiono koncepcję organizacji systemu obsługiwania obiektów pojazdów szynowych (ops), jako elementu w warstwowym modelu systemu bezpieczeństwa tych obiektów. Koncepcja metody polega na zastosowaniu warstwy zabezpieczeń w postaci systemu okresowych obsług profilaktycznych. Analizę systemu bezpieczeństwa przeprowadzono metodą Analizy Warstw Zabezpieczeń (AWZ). Przedstawiono algorytm metody AWZ dla ops. Podano sposób optymalizacji czasu między obsługami elementów ops.

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“…Consequently, the increasing complexity of transportation systems makes their development and safety analysis more difficult. The identification of necessary safety conditions to reduce the occurrence of dangerous situations is important to guarantee required safety integrity level (SIL) [1]. This parameter directly impacts the system architecture design and determines the risk reduction factor required for safety functions.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A model-based system engineering approach to manage railway safety-related decisions

Debbech¹,

Bon²,

Collart-Dutilleul³

2019

Int. J. TDI

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The safety assessment of Safety Critical Systems (SCSs) is a challenging task since it involves different actors and a combination of several knowledge domains. This increases the complexity of the integration of safety requirements into the design model. Consequently, there is a need for a shared model with an unambiguous terminology aiming to avoid misunderstandings between both safety and design teams. In this paper, we propose a model-based system engineering approach in order to support the goal-oriented safety reasoning and to provide a common model between both safety and requirement engineering driven by goals. Furthermore, the present study considers the safety rules development process based on the Organization-based Access Control (Or-BAC) model, which is normally used to improve the security of the information systems. Then, the common vocabulary proposed for the interpretation of the considered notions of domains is defined. Moreover, safety requirements are expressed with a high level of abstraction according to the required railway knowledge and the requirement traceability process is considered through an up-bottom reasoning using the Unified Modeling Language (UML) diagrams. The proposed approach aims to provide a methodology able to identify safety conditions in order to anticipate risks and to make better safety-related decisions. Finally, the proposed methodology is evaluated through a real accident scenario analysis in order to validate its adaptability to represent real critical situations.

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Techniques for assigning a target safety integrity level

Cited by 26 publications

References 0 publications

Hazard and operability (HAZOP) analysis. A literature review

Hazard and operability (HAZOP) analysis. A literature review

System obsługiwania pojazdów szynowych jako element w warstwowym modelu ich systemów bezpieczeństwa

A model-based system engineering approach to manage railway safety-related decisions

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