Teasing a Limited Deontological Theory of Morals Out of Hobbes

Harvey, Martin

doi:10.1111/j.0031-806x.2004.00158.x

Cited by 3 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…The seminal deontological reading is Taylor (1938). For a more recent discussion, see Harvey (2004). 30 Which could pose a problem to interpretations drawing on the notion of moral goodness developed in this passage (e.g.…”

Section: Two Textual Anomaliesmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Absence of Moral Goodness in Hobbes’s Ethics

Olsthoorn

2020

J Ethics

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This article reassesses Hobbes's place in the history of ethics based on the first systematic analysis of his various classifications of formal goodness. The good was traditionally divided into three: profitably good, pleasurably good, and morally good (bonum honestum). Across his works, Hobbes replaced the last with pulchrum-a decidedly non-moral form of goodness on his account. I argue that Hobbes's dismissal of moral goodness was informed by his hedonist conception of the good and accompanied by reinterpretations of right reason and natural law. By dispensing moral goodness and insisting on the hedonist and relational nature of the good, Hobbes moreover recast and rendered more urgent the question of why we should be moral. Hobbes is commonly thought to have raised this question so starkly because of his general insensitivity to the demands of justice. My analysis suggests that it may also, or rather, have been due to his restrictive conception of the good. A comparison with other moral philosophers from the period-including Suárez, Gassendi, Locke, and Pufendorf-indicates how unusual Hobbes's jettisoning of moral goodness was.

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Section: Two Textual Anomaliesmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Absence of Moral Goodness in Hobbes’s Ethics

Olsthoorn

2020

J Ethics

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“…Hobbes' answer (XV.5) focuses on the unpredictability resulting from such an attitude, which would create a situation impossible to reckon upon, rendering the fool's position effectively foolish. While most commentators found said answer unsatisfying (Zaitchik, : 246–247), or even ‘lame’ (Gauthier, : 548; Harvey, : 43), they also assumed that a proper response should be found within the same framework, as a defense of the (instrumental) rationality of keeping faith in the state of nature, so that covenants could be employed as the means to evade it and create the Commonwealth. The game‐theoretical discussions, thus, focused on the formalization of the state of nature and the factors that could alter the payoffs, making the ‘game’ more amenable to a solution.…”

Section: Game‐theoretical ‘Fooles’ and The Limits Of Consequentialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hobbes on Teleology and Reason

Parietti

2017

European J of Philosophy

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Starting from considering how radical Hobbes' rejection of teleology was, this paper presents a coherent reading of Hobbesian reason, as applied to the justification of political obligation, striking a more perspicuous third way between the ‘orthodox’ (based on self‐interest and consequentialism) and the ‘revisionist’ (moralizing, or variously substantive) readings. Both families of interpretations are partial to some elements of Hobbes' thought, therefore incapable of providing a coherent reading of its whole. A precise rendering of Hobbes' deontological reason allows a better hermeneutical understanding of his philosophy as well as a keener appreciation of its relevance for past and present political thought.

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“…6 6 For deontological readings of Hobbes's theory of obligation, see Taylor 1993. See also Raphael 1977, Ludwig 1998, and Harvey 2004. For a detailed refutation, see Eggers 2009. …”

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confidence: 99%

Hobbes and Game Theory Revisited: Zero‐sum Games in the State of Nature

Eggers

2011

The Southern J of Philosophy

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The aim of this paper is to critically review the game-theoretic discussion of Hobbes and to develop a game-theoretic interpretation that gives due attention both to Hobbes's distinction between "moderates" and "dominators" and to what actually initiates conflict in the state of nature, namely, the competition for vital goods. As can be shown, Hobbes's state of nature contains differently structured situations of choice, the game-theoretic representation of which requires the prisoner's dilemma and the assurance game and the so-called assurance dilemma. However, the "state of war" ultimately emerges from situations that cannot be described by any of these games because they represent zero-sum games in which the outcome of mutual cooperation does not exist.

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Teasing a Limited Deontological Theory of Morals Out of Hobbes

Cited by 3 publications

References 5 publications

On the Absence of Moral Goodness in Hobbes’s Ethics

On the Absence of Moral Goodness in Hobbes’s Ethics

Hobbes on Teleology and Reason

Hobbes and Game Theory Revisited: Zero‐sum Games in the State of Nature

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