Teams, Teamwork and Absence*

Heywood, John S.; Jirjahn, Uwe

doi:10.1111/j.0347-0520.2004.00387.x

“…Askenazy and Caroli (2010) report that in France innovative workplace practices are positively associated with mental strain and with worker perceptions of occupational risks, but not with occupational injury. Heywood and Jirjahn (2004) find absence rates are lower in German manufacturing in the presence of team-working. However, Frick and Simmons's (2010) case study of a large German steel plant supports the contention that HIM increases accidents and absenteeism via labour intensification.…”

mentioning

confidence: 75%

“…In the case of incentive pay, loss aversion will encourage workers to attend because absent workers forgo incentive payments (Merriman and Deckop, 2007). Where worker inputs are complementary, as in the case of team-working, workers may come under co-worker pressures to minimise absence, particularly if performance is judged on team outputs (Drago and Wooden, 1992;Kandel and Lazear, 1992;Knez and Simester, 2001;Heywood and Jirjahn, 2004).…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Does high involvement management improve worker wellbeing?

Böckerman

¹

,

Bryson

²

,

Ilmakunnas

³

2012

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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Employees exposed to high involvement management (HIM) practices have higher subjective wellbeing, fewer accidents but more short absence spells than "like" employees not exposed to HIM.These results are robust to extensive work, wage and sickness absence history controls. We highlight the possibility of higher short-term absence in the presence of HIM because it is more demanding than standard production and because multi-skilled HIM workers cover for one another's short absences thus reducing the cost of replacement labour faced by the employer. We find direct empirical support for this. In accordance with the theoretical framework we find also that long-term absences are independent of exposure to HIM, which is consistent with long-term absences entailing replacement labour costs and with short absences having a negative effect on longer absences.JEL classification: I10; J28; J81; M52; M53; M54

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“…Our analysis is, hence, also related to contributions which indicate a positive relationship between firm-level collective bargaining and absence for Spain (García-Serrano and Malo 2009), Canada (Dionne and Dostie 2007), and the United States (Allen 1981(Allen , 1984Leigh 1981Leigh , 1985. In partial contrast, centralised collective bargaining seems to have no impact on sickness absence in Britain (Heywood et al 2008) and Germany (Heywood and Jirjahn 2004), and union density does not appear to affect absence rates in Norway (Mastekaasa 2013).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 71%

Sickness Absence and Works Councils: Evidence from German Individual and Linked Employer-Employee Data

Arnold

¹

,

Brändle

²

,

Goerke

³

2014

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Using both household and linked employer-employee data for Germany, we assess the effects of non-union representation in the form of works councils on (1) individual sickness absence rates and (2) a subjective measure of personnel problems due to sickness absence as perceived by a firm's management. We find that the existence of a works council is positively correlated with the incidence and the annual duration of absence. We observe a more pronounced correlation in western Germany which can also be interpreted causally. Further, personnel problems due to absence are more likely to occur in plants with a works council. Terms of use: Documents inJEL Classification: J53, I18, M54

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“…Recently, economists have turned their focus to the demand side of the market, and most notably to firm characteristics that are argued to affect the cost of absence. Typical examples include working time schedules (Brown and Sessions 1996), unionization (Allen 1984), "assembly line" technologies (Coles and Tremble 1996;Coles et al 2007), teamwork (Heywood and Jirjahn 2004;Heywood et al 2008), and firm size (Barmby and Stephan 2000).…”

Section: Prp and Absenteeismmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Effect of Variable Pay Schemes on Workplace Absenteeism

Pouliakas

¹

,

Θεοδωρόπουλος²

2012

Research in Labor Economics

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. www.econstor.eu The Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in Bonn is a local and virtual international research center and a place of communication between science, politics and business. IZA is an independent nonprofit organization supported by Deutsche Post Foundation. The center is associated with the University of Bonn and offers a stimulating research environment through its international network, workshops and conferences, data service, project support, research visits and doctoral program. IZA engages in (i) original and internationally competitive research in all fields of labor economics, (ii) development of policy concepts, and (iii) dissemination of research results and concepts to the interested public. Terms of use: Documents in D I S C U S S I O N P A P E R S E R I E SIZA Discussion Papers often represent preliminary work and are circulated to encourage discussion. Citation of such a paper should account for its provisional character. A revised version may be available directly from the author. We estimate the effect of variable pay schemes on workplace absenteeism using two cross sections of British establishments. Private sector establishments that explicitly link pay with individual performance are found to have significantly lower absence rates. This effect is stronger for establishments that offer variable pay schemes to a greater share of their nonmanagerial workforce. Matched employer-employee data suggest that the effect is robust to a number of sensitivity tests. We also find that firms that tie a greater proportion of employees' earnings to variable pay schemes are also found to experience lower absence rates. Further, quintile regression results suggest that variable pay schemes have a stronger effect on establishments with an absence rate that is higher than an average or "sustainable" level. Finally, panel data suggest that a feedback mechanism is present, whereby high absenteeism in the past is related to a greater future incidence of individual variable pay schemes, which, in turn, is correlated with lower absence rates.JEL Classification: J22, J33, C21

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Teams, Teamwork and Absence*

Cited by 79 publications

References 31 publications

Does high involvement management improve worker wellbeing?

Does high involvement management improve worker wellbeing?

Sickness Absence and Works Councils: Evidence from German Individual and Linked Employer-Employee Data

The Effect of Variable Pay Schemes on Workplace Absenteeism

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