Teaching giants to learn: lessons from army learning in World War II

Abstract

Purpose This paper aims to discuss the “truism” that learning organizations cannot be large organizations and, conversely, that large organizations cannot be learning organizations. This paper analyzes learning in the German and US armies in the Second World War, based on a four-dimensional model of the learning organization. Design/methodology/approach The paper entails a secondary analysis of historical and military sources and data. Findings It is found that the German and US armies differed in learning capacity, which can be plausibly, but not exclusively, related to differences in the battlefield performance between those armies in the Second World War. Research limitations/implications The research scope of the paper is limited to the analysis of two particular armies in the Second World War. Implications of theory reside in the importance of organizational learning capacity and its dimensions for learning in current organizations. Practical implications The paper has clear practical implications for large organizations wishing to become effective and responsible learning organizations. Originality/value This is among the first organizational papers to analyze army learning in the Second World War and to derive lessons from that analysis for current large organizations.

Preparedness and Multiagency Collaboration—Lessons Learned from a Case Study in the Norwegian Armed Forces

“…An air force is termed as a high-risk organization within the taxonomy of Charles Perrow [1]. It has been argued that military operations and especially sharp operations can be described as dynamic, turbulent and competitive [2]. Norway, like many other nations, has applied "mission command" that aims to reduce the gap between plans and the actual chaos of war.…”

Learning to organize and organizing to learn: the case of Dutch military expeditionary task forces

“…Traditionally, military organizations are not known for their capabilities for innovation, learning and creativity, being mostly portrayed as hierarchical and cautious operating 'machines' (Hasselbladh and Ydén, 2019;Morgan, 2006). In the past decades, however, it has been increasingly acknowledged that combat represents a dynamic, turbulent and competitive situation that poses important challenges to those purportedly hierarchical machines (Visser, 2017). This holds in particular for military organizations after the end of the Cold War, with the advent of local conflicts, United Nations (UN) peace-keeping and nation-building missions and the emergence of dispersed guerilla and terrorist networks and groups (Kramer, 2007;Kuronen and Huhtinen, 2017;Vogelaar and Kramer, 2004).…”

“…The purpose of this paper is to provide insight in how military expeditionary task forces cope with the dual challenge of organizing and learning, by reflecting on the experiences of Dutch expeditionary task forces (ETFs) in peace-keeping and nation-building missions in Bosnia, Iraq and Afghanistan. This is relevant for future missions and the military organization, teaching and training, and in a more general way for non-military organizations facing (potentially) turbulent and dangerous conditions, such as crisis response organizations, police forces, fire departments, air traffic controllers or (nuclear) power plants (Visser, 2017). In the next section, we discuss the literature on learning and organizing, where we provide a discussion and analysis of several cases involving Dutch ETFs, which help to illustrate the dynamics of the relationship between organizing and learning.…”