2015
DOI: 10.1080/09592318.2015.1007561
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‘Taylor must go’ – the strategy of the Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy

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Cited by 11 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…1 This first war ended in a 1996 peace agreement, which paved way for presidential elections overwhelmingly won by Taylor the year later. Unable to bring peace, Taylor soon faced renewed rebellion (Käihkö 2015). By the time he left to exile in August 2003, Liberia had experienced war for 14 years, and was widely perceived as an archetype of a devastated postconflict country ripe for renewed conflict.…”
Section: Researching Former Combatants In Liberiamentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…1 This first war ended in a 1996 peace agreement, which paved way for presidential elections overwhelmingly won by Taylor the year later. Unable to bring peace, Taylor soon faced renewed rebellion (Käihkö 2015). By the time he left to exile in August 2003, Liberia had experienced war for 14 years, and was widely perceived as an archetype of a devastated postconflict country ripe for renewed conflict.…”
Section: Researching Former Combatants In Liberiamentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Lacking any other means of influence, they claim that they still exert authority over former combatants. In reality, past election results alone prove that the influence of most of these actors waned fast in the postconflict (Käihkö 2015). 3.…”
mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Yet as many armed groups are unable to rely on strong state and ideology such as nationalism, they face the practical conundrum of how to form cohesion. With a number of different alternatives available, it is especially weak armed groups that need to dedicate significant attention in their strategies to this task (Käihkö, 2015b). Yet without a broader perspective that encompasses micro-, meso-, and macro-levels, it is be difficult to understand how such actors go about this.…”
Section: )mentioning
confidence: 99%
“…After the waning of the war in Sierra Leone in 2001-2002, many fighters joined Charles Taylor's militia umbrella and the rebels of Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD). In there they were again accused of behaving in ways considered inappropriate to the local context by both the LURD rebels, 66 as well as the government militias. 67 Whereas war in Liberia and Sierra Leone portrayed some similarities, the war in Liberia is often described as a "tribal conflict" (in Liberian English ethnic groups are colloquially called "tribes") by Liberian civilians and former fighters alike, whereas the one in Sierra Leone is more often connected to atrocities.…”
Section: Liberia and Sierra Leonementioning
confidence: 99%