Taxation, politics, and protest in Ireland, 1662–2016

Doyle, Patrick

doi:10.1080/09670882.2020.1748166

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

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“…Nevertheless, financialization requires central bankers to pay closer attention to non-traditional players, especially those operating within the burgeoning shadow banking sector. Particularly important entities include Special Purpose Vehicle corporations and money-market funds whose activities were critical in masking dangerous leverage ratios and liquidity vulnerabilities in the run up to the 2007/2008 financial crash (Doyle et al., 2016). Nevertheless, these actors remain salient in the provision of short-term wholesale funding and credit intermediation, prompting regulatory moves to monitor and gain transparency over their activities in the post crisis era.…”

Section: Instrumental Power and Central Bankingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The cases of Greece and Ireland – two of the first countries to receive EU financial assistance – illustrate both sides of this policy. As revealed through the Irish national banking inquiry, as well as the release of privately sent ECB letters, Trichet forcefully argued that to impose private losses on international investors would be a huge mistake and put considerable pressure on successive Irish finance ministers to avoid this course of action (Doyle et al., 2016). This took place initially in 2010, when the Irish government made the catastrophic decision to give a blanket guarantee of €440 billion (237% of GDP) to their entire banking industry.…”

Section: Structural Power and The Ecbmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Central banking and financial political power: An investigation into the European Central Bank

Kalaitzake

2018

Competition & Change

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In the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, there has been a major scholarly revival of the topic of financial political power and a refocus on questions concerning democracy, elites, and inequality. Nevertheless, there remains a dearth in the literature regarding the precise nature of the political relationship between the financial sector and central banks. This is problematic given the sharp rise in institutional prominence enjoyed by central bank officials in the post crisis era and their fundamental importance in the governance of financial markets. As a corrective, this paper develops a provisional analytical framework through which the power dynamics between the financial sector and central banks can be fruitfully explored, specifically with reference to the European Central Bank. It does so by identifying four mechanisms through which financial actors potentially influence the policy choices of the European Central Bank – revolving doors, closed policy circles, capital flight/disinvestment, Too Big to Fail – and illustrates their operation empirically in the context of the bank’s organizational functioning and post crisis interventions. The paper illustrates how financial actors enjoy systematic advantages in the domain of central bank policymaking and provides significant evidence that the European Central Bank has been a key ally of the financial sector throughout the Eurozone crisis. The paper calls for a more extensive examination by scholars of the financial sector-central bank relationship as a means to clarify the precise scope of, and limitations to, contemporary financial political power.

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Section: Instrumental Power and Central Bankingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Structural Power and The Ecbmentioning

confidence: 99%