Taxation by Regulation

Posner, Richard A.

doi:10.2307/3003161

Cited by 408 publications

(123 citation statements)

References 16 publications

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“…In practice, regulators do not always face ideal incentives to foster and manage industry competition appropriately. This is the case in part because competition can constrain a regulator's ability to implement policies that favor some constituents over others (Posner, 1971). For example, unfettered entry of new suppliers can limit a regulator's ability to set high prices for some services (e.g., long distance telephone service) in order to generate the revenue an incumbent supplier requires to finance particularly low prices for other services (e.g., basic local telephone service).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Regulating regulators in transitionally competitive markets

Sappington

Weisman

2012

J Regul Econ

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During the course of the first thirty CRRI conferences, we have gained considerable insight about how to design regulatory policy in the presence of developing competition. The insight to date has focused on how to harness competitive forces to motivate incumbent suppliers to serve the best interests of consumers. This paper stresses the importance of considering the incentives of regulators and explores the associated changes in standard recommendations for regulatory policy design in the presence of developing competition.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…To protect revenue sources that finance valued redistribution, regulators can be tempted to limit the operations of competitors (Posner, 1971). Indeed, state regulators -those with direct 2 This mandate was intended in part to secure low transport prices for producers of agricultural products.…”

Section: The Rationale For Regulating Regulators' Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Regulating regulators in transitionally competitive markets

Sappington

Weisman

2012

J Regul Econ

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“…S t~~l e r m l ; Posner 1971Posner ,1974Peltzman 1976;Aranson and Ordeshook 1981). 4 Second, interpreted in an Austrian construct, the Rubin and Priest (1977) models gave indirect evidence of a rivalrous, entrepreneurial legal process, evolutionary in character, in which the decision to sue or settle rests on individual (disequilibrium) margins of opportunity for gain (or avoidance of loss).…”

Section: /'mentioning

confidence: 99%

The common law as central economic planning

Aranson

1992

Constit Polit Econ

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Central economic planning traditionally has set goals and allocated resources by supplanting the price system with central direction. Planners engaged in industry-by-industry and firn-by-firm decision making, all to achieve predetermined targets. The neoclassical approach to law and economics posits that common lawjudges engage in a similaractivity, in rendering decisions that maximize wealth. A significant feature of this approach is the dacement of iudges in the msition of calculators of com~arative values. Neither --advocates of central planning nor those of judicial wealth maximizing address or solve the economic calculation ~roblem. The various aspects of that problem hold two imdicationsfor common lawjudges. First, they cannot accomplish the tasks that theneoclassical approach sets oul for them. Second, a recognition of the calculation problem leads to a rejection of balancing and the choice of rights-based, bright-line rules that return actual and potential litigants' decisions to the market.

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“…For the moment, Switzerland's authorities are integrated within the Central Federal 16 Loi sur la Pre´voyance Professionnelle Vieillesse, Survivants et Invalidite´. 17 Kahn (1971);Posner (1971); Stigler (1971); Buchanan and Tollison (1972);Peltzman (1976 Administration or attached to a federal department on an administrative level. Because of the complexity of tasks, greater autonomy and financial independence would be necessary.…”

Section: Institutional Surveillancementioning

confidence: 99%

The Integrated Supervision of Financial Markets: The Case of Switzerland

Gugler

2005

Geneva Pap Risk Insur Issues Pract

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Sound financial markets are of tremendous importance to the functioning of a national economy. Regulation and supervision are essential not only in order to maintain the financial markets' stability and integrity, but also to protect the interests of depositors, investors, consumers, and insurance policyholders and ensure the proper functioning of business transactions. In order to monitor effectively the current developments of financial markets, it is essential to review and adjust periodically regulation and supervision mechanisms.

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Taxation by Regulation

Cited by 408 publications

References 16 publications

Regulating regulators in transitionally competitive markets

Regulating regulators in transitionally competitive markets

The common law as central economic planning

The Integrated Supervision of Financial Markets: The Case of Switzerland

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