Taxation and the household

Apps, Patricia; Rees, Ray

doi:10.1016/0047-2727(88)90037-0

Cited by 310 publications

(280 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…They focused on the optimal linear-income taxation of twoearner households with exogenously given di¤erences in labor supply elasticities between men and women. 2 More recently, Alesina, Ichino, and Karabarbounis (2011) put forward more forcefully the idea of di¤erential taxation of men and women within a model in which gender di¤erences in labor supply elasticities emerge endogenously. Under parametric restrictions, they conclude that married women should be taxed at lower rates than married men.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taxing women: A macroeconomic analysis

Guner

Kaygusuz

Ventura

2012

Journal of Monetary Economics

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Based on well-known evidence on labor supply elasticities, several authors have concluded that women should be taxed at lower rates than men. We evaluate the quantitative implications of taxing women at a lower rate than men. Relative to the current system of taxation, setting a proportional tax rate on married females equal to 4% (8%) increases output and married female labor force participation by about 3.9% (3.4%) and 6.9% (4.0%), respectively. Gender-based taxes improve welfare and are preferred by a majority of households. Nevertheless, welfare gains are higher when the U.S. tax system is replaced by a proportional, gender-neutral income tax.JEL Classi…cations: E62, H31, J12, J22

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Taxing women: A macroeconomic analysis

Guner

Kaygusuz

Ventura

2012

Journal of Monetary Economics

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“…2 The more challenging task is to characterize this general tax schedule and to study the factors which affect the spouses' relative marginal tax rates. Cremer et al (2012), for instance, take a step in that direction and show that depending on the pattern of 1 Examples are papers by Apps and Rees (1988;1999) or more recently Kleven (2004), Alesina, Ichino and Karabarbounis (2011), and Bastani (2013). 2 More formally, the second order cross derivative of the tax function is not zero.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Household bargaining and the design of couples’ income taxation

Cremer

Lozachmeur

Carrizosa

et al. 2016

European Economic Review

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Terms of use: Documents in AbstractThe paper studies the design of couples' income taxation when consumption and labor supply decisions within the couple are made in a cooperative way according to some bargaining scheme. Specifically, the couple maximizes a weighted sum of the spouses' utilities. In the first part of the paper, the spouses' bargaining weights (specific to each couple) are exogenously given. In the second part, these bargaining weights are endogenous, and depend on the spouses' respective contributions to total family income. The information structure is the traditional one in Mirrleesian nonlinear income tax models. However, while the household's total consumption is publicly observable, the consumption levels of the individual spouses are not observable. The social welfare function is utilitarian. We show that the expression for a spouses' marginal income tax rate includes a "Pigouvian" (paternalistic) and an incentive term. With exogenous weights the Pigouvian term favors a marginal subsidy (tax) for the high-weight (lowweight) spouse, whose labor supply otherwise tends to be too low (high). In some cases both terms have the same sign and imply a positive marginal tax for the low-weight spouse and a negative one for the high-weight spouse.

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“…The left hand panels show the levels for wives and husbands. 4 . As can be seen there is considerable dispersion.…”

Section: Time Usementioning

confidence: 99%

“…A number of di¤erent approaches have been suggested; see Browning, Chiappori and Lechene (2005) for references. One particularly popular approach is to assume that, however decisions are made, the outcome is always Pareto-e¢ cient, see Chiappori (1988), Apps and Rees (1988) and Browning and Chiappori (1998). This assumption is central in the 'collective model'where the distribution of 'power'in the household contributes to determining intra-household distribution.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Spending Time and Money within the Household*

Browning

Gørtz

2012

Scandinavian J Economics

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We consider theoretically and empirically the allocation of time and money within the household. The novelty of our empirical work is that we have a survey which provides information on both time use and the allocation of some goods within the household, for the same households. Thus we can consider whether a partner who enjoys more leisure also receives more consumption, which looks like the outcome of 'power'within the household, or receives less consumption, which looks like di¤ering tastes across households.

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Taxation and the household

Cited by 310 publications

References 13 publications

Taxing women: A macroeconomic analysis

Taxing women: A macroeconomic analysis

Household bargaining and the design of couples’ income taxation

Spending Time and Money within the Household*

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