Tax/subsidy policies in the presence of environmentally aware consumers

Bansal, Sangeeta; Gang, Ira N.

doi:10.1016/s0095-0696(02)00061-x

Cited by 239 publications

(173 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…From a micro-theoretical perspective, Conrad (2005), using a micro model of consumer preferences, suggests that increasing environmental awareness negatively affects the utility of consuming a product for which a greener substitute is available. Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003) study the welfare responses to environmental taxation policies and show that consumers are willing to pay more for greener products.…”

Section: Mechanisms Linking Environmental Awareness With Consumption mentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental awareness, consumption, and labor supply: Empirical evidence from household survey data

Iosifidi

2016

Ecological Economics

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Section: Mechanisms Linking Environmental Awareness With Consumption mentioning

confidence: 99%

Environmental awareness, consumption, and labor supply: Empirical evidence from household survey data

Iosifidi

2016

Ecological Economics

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“…One argument relies upon the assumption that consumers are environmentally concerned and thus they reward …rms that overcomply by redirecting their demand towards them (Arora and Gangopadhyay 1995 (from now on, AG95), Bansal The present analysis nests in the approach related to the presence of green consumers. In particular, AG95 and Bansal and Gangopadhyay (2003) examine a vertically di¤erentiated duopoly where …rms sell a good di¤ering in environmental quality (due to higher environmental production standards) and compete in prices. They show that overcompliance may emerge but…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Emergence of Overcompliance with Endogenous Environmental Standards and Patronising Consumers

Lambertini

Tampieri

2012

SSRN Journal

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We propose a model of environmental overcompliance in a duopoly setting where consumers are environmentally concerned and may patronise the product they buy, …rms set their green investment to abate the impact of productivity on pollution and a government sets the environmental standard with the aim to maximise welfare. We show that, with no patronising consumers, overcompliance is unilateral by the …rm with higher quality standard under Bertrand behaviour, whereas both …rms may overcomply under Cournot competition if the environmental impact of production is su¢ ciently low. Conversely with patronising consumers, overcompliance is unilateral with low environmental impact of production under price competition, and both …rm overcomply under quantity competition.JEL codes: L13, L51, Q50.

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“…A first group of paper focused on how the presence of green consumers interacts with the optimal environmental policy (see Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995;Cremer and Thisse, 1999; Moraga-Gonzalez and Padron-Fumero, 2002; Bansal and Gangopadhyay, 2003;Lombardini-Riipinen, 2005). A second group dealt with the impact of a higher consumers' consciousness on the market equilibrium and the associated social welfare.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For instance, standard for profit firms may compete with nonprofit firms, whose main objective is the maximization of the positive externality associated to their production. 4 Recently many firms spend a lot of efforts in order to persuade consumers that their behavior is socially responsible. However, there is not a general consensus with regard to the exact concept of corporate social responsibility (CSR).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Market Equilibrium in the Presence of Green Consumers and Responsible Firms: A Comparative Statics Analysis

Doni

Ricchiuti

2011

SSRN Journal

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SummaryThis paper analyzes how the interaction between green consumers and responsible firms affects the market equilibrium. The main result is that a higher responsibility by both producers and consumers can have different impacts on the efficiency of the firms' abatement activity, depending on the nature of the cleaning costs. When the abatement costs are fixed, the efficiency of the clean-up effort is always increasing in their degree of responsibility. On the other hand, when the abatement costs are variable, a higher level of responsibility may reduce social welfare. Finally, the first best allocation is never reached, even in the presence of the highest credible level of responsibility of both consumers and producers. Keywords February, 2011Abstract This paper analyzes how the interaction between green consumers and responsible firms affects the market equilibrium. The main result is that a higher responsibility by both producers and consumers can have different impacts on the efficiency of the firms' abatement activity, depending on the nature of the cleaning costs. When the abatement costs are fixed, the efficiency of the clean-up effort is always increasing in their degree of responsibility. On the other hand, when the abatement costs are variable, a higher level of responsibility may reduce social welfare. Finally, the first best allocation is never reached, even in the presence of the highest credible level of responsibility of both consumers and producers.

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Tax/subsidy policies in the presence of environmentally aware consumers

Cited by 239 publications

References 13 publications

Environmental awareness, consumption, and labor supply: Empirical evidence from household survey data

Environmental awareness, consumption, and labor supply: Empirical evidence from household survey data

On the Emergence of Overcompliance with Endogenous Environmental Standards and Patronising Consumers

Market Equilibrium in the Presence of Green Consumers and Responsible Firms: A Comparative Statics Analysis

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