Tax and Expenditure Limitations: Introduction and Overview

Mullins, Daniel R.; Wallin, Bruce A.

doi:10.1111/j.0275-1100.2004.00344.x

Cited by 194 publications

(217 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…This finding provides further support to the conclusions of Mullins and Wallin (2004), who survey previous studies of these budgetary rules.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 86%

The Case for Countercyclical Fiscal Capacity

Hou¹,

Moynihan

2006

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

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A growing literature has sought to demonstrate when and how government capacity links to performance. This article examines those questions in the area of financial management. A basic challenge for state governments is to maintain budgetary stability and program predictability in face of economic downturns. State governments can best meet this challenge by developing what we call counter-cyclical fiscal capacity. We present the concept of countercyclical fiscal capacity as the creation and use of financial tools that help state governments maintain counter-cyclical spending and program stability during revenue shocks. We operationalize the concept in terms of fiscal reserves that are used to mitigate emergency spending cuts and tax increases, and analyze the operation of such reserves over a period that includes recessions in 1991 and 2001. We find evidence of the efficacy of counter-cyclical fiscal capacity, and argue for greater investments in this aspect of government capacity.2

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“…This finding provides further support to the conclusions of Mullins and Wallin (2004), who survey previous studies of these budgetary rules.…”

Section: Resultssupporting

confidence: 86%

The Case for Countercyclical Fiscal Capacity

Hou¹,

Moynihan

2006

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

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“…Most importantly, there are a variety of state institutions that constrain municipal tax and revenue policies (Ladd andYinger, 1989, Chapter 6, Mullins andWallin, 2004). Indeed, many states have passed limits on municipalities' ability to levy property taxes (Ladd and Yinger, 1989, 136-137).…”

Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Indeed, many states have passed limits on municipalities' ability to levy property taxes (Ladd and Yinger, 1989, 136-137). Some states limit property tax revenues relative to property value, while others limit municipalities' ability to increase property tax rates or property assessments (Mullins and Cox, 1995;Mullins and Wallin, 2004). Moreover, about a quarter of states ban local municipalities from levying sales taxes on their citizens, and almost every state imposes some limits on sales tax levels (NCSL, 1997).…”

Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Mayoral Partisanship and Municipal Fiscal Policy

Benedictis-Kessner

Warshaw

2016

The Journal of Politics

150

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Does it matter for municipal fiscal policies which party controls the mayorship in municipal government? The bulk of the existing evidence says no. But there are a variety of theoretical reasons to believe that mayoral partisanship should affect municipal policy outcomes. In this paper, we examine this question using data on nearly 1000 elections in medium and large cities over the past 60 years. In contrast to previous work, we find that mayoral partisanship has a significant impact on the size of municipal government. Overall, Democratic mayors spend more than Republican mayors. The bulk of this additional spending comes on roads, housing, libraries, and interest. We find a modest impact of mayoral partisanship on city tax levels. However, Democratic mayors issue substantially more debt than Republican ones. They also spend much more to service interest on debt. Our findings show that mayoral partisanship matters for city policy. Moreover, our findings add to a growing literature indicating that the constraints imposed on city policymaking do not prevent public opinion and elections from having a meaningful impact on municipal policy.

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“…Although public agents may be budget-maximizers (Niskanen, 1971), governments often face institutional rules and restrictions from citizen-imposed tax and expenditure limitations (TELs), balanced budget legislation, and referendum requirements for tax or spending proposals, which constrain the budgetary authority of public agents (Mullins & Wallin, 2004). On the other hand, tax expenditures, which are simply the estimated real cost of tax deductions and exemptions inherent in a government's tax system legislation, are not considered direct spending or taxation.…”

Section: Rent-seeking and Government Spendingmentioning

confidence: 99%