Tarski’s one and only concept of truth

Abstract

In a recent article, Marian David (2008) distinguishes between two interpretations of Tarski's work on truth. The standard interpretation has it that Tarski gave us a definition of truth in-L within the meta-language; the non-standard interpretation, that Tarski did not give us a definition of true sentence in L, but rather a definition of truth, and Tarski does so for L within the meta-language. The difference is crucial: for on the standard view, there are different concepts of truth, while in the alternative interpretation there is just one concept. In this paper we will have a brief look at the distinction between these two interpretations and at the arguments David gives for each view. We will evaluate one of David's arguments for the alternative view by looking at Tarski's 'On the Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages', and his use of the term 'extension' therein, which, we shall find, yields no conclusive evidence for either position. Then we will look at how Tarski treats 'satisfaction', an essential concept for his definition of 'true sentence'. It will be argued that, in light of how Tarski talks about 'satisfaction' in §4 of 'On the Concept of Truth in Formalized Languages' and his claims in the Postscript, the alternative view is more likely than the standard one.

The evolution of the importance of the true and fair view (TFV) principle. The case of Poland

“…Aristotle's concept is the standard version of the corresponding theory of truth, which says that the truth of a sentence consists in its agreement with reality. On the other hand, there are nonclassic definitions based on relativism [Austin 1950;David 1994;Smid 2014], which generally state that truth depends on some final criterion (more detailed in [Tarski 1933;Tarski 1949;David 1994;Davidson 1990Kirkham 1992van Hulle 1997;Piechocka-Kałużna 2014;Küne 2003]). Summarizing the reflections on truth, the most appropriate approach, from the accounting point of view, is based on Popper idea of verisimilitude [Popper 1972;Kueth 2005;Tichy 1974;Rescher 1973] that assumes that one can speak of better or worse approximations to the truth rather than absolute truth itself.…”