Targeted Prevention and Control of Key Links in Airports to Mitigate Public Health Risks

Xu, Dongqun; Zhang, Zhuona; Qin, Wang; Li, Xia

doi:10.46234/ccdcw2021.212

Cited by 3 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…Collison Nebulizer (BGI, INC, Waltham, MA, USA) was used to simulate respiration of the infected person and generated 10 12 -10 13 balls per hour. Specific methods were described in previously published papers [4,9,10].…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulation Studies Provide Evidence of Aerosol Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in a Multi-Story Building via Air Supply, Exhaust and Sanitary Pipelines

Zhang¹,

Li²,

Wang³

et al. 2022

IJERPH

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A cross-layer non-vertical transmission of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) occurred in a quarantine hotel in Guangzhou, Guangdong Province, China in June 2021. To explore the cross-layer transmission path and influencing factors of viral aerosol, we set up different scenarios to carry out simulation experiments. The results showed that the air in the polluted room can enter the corridor by opening the door to take food and move out the garbage, then mix with the fresh air taken from the outside as part of the air supply of the central air conditioning system and re-enter into different rooms on the same floor leading to the same-layer transmission. In addition, flushing the toilet after defecation and urination will produce viral aerosol that pollutes rooms on different floors through the exhaust system and the vertical drainage pipe in the bathroom, resulting in cross-layer vertical transmission, also aggravating the transmission in different rooms on the same floor after mixing with the air of the room and entering the corridor to become part of the air supply, and meanwhile, continuing to increase the cross-layer transmission through the vertical drainage pipe. Therefore, the air conditioning and ventilation system of the quarantine hotel should be operated in full fresh air mode and close the return air; the exhaust volume of the bathroom should be greater than the fresh air volume. The exhaust pipe of the bathroom should be independently set and cannot be interconnected or connected in series. The riser of the sewage and drainage pipeline of the bathroom should maintain vertical to exhaust independently and cannot be arbitrarily changed to horizontal pipe assembly.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Simulation Studies Provide Evidence of Aerosol Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in a Multi-Story Building via Air Supply, Exhaust and Sanitary Pipelines

Zhang¹,

Li²,

Wang³

et al. 2022

IJERPH

Self Cite

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“…However, there was only one vent in the toilet in Zone E, and the virus aerosol produced by toilet flushing after fecal excretion was not easy to be discharged, which had the risk of indoor diffusion. In addition, the strict closed-loop management of crew members and cleaners at Xi'an Xianyang International Airport and the standardized wearing of personal protective equipment made the transmission caused by the lack of standardized wearing of personal protective equipment, such as by cleaners at Nanjing Lukou Airport, impossible [7].…”

Section: Analysis Of Other Factors That May Affect Transmissionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…An international airport is a public place with a large population flow where there are many 2 of 11 conditioning and ventilation facilities and the airflow layout is complex, which increases the pressure for epidemic prevention and control in the airport. Xu et al [7] found that aerosols could spread over a long distance through the supply and return of air through the central air conditioning system in Shenzhen Bao'an Airport. In order to prevent the infection of domestic personnel caused by infected people on international flights, many airports separate the international arrival area from the domestic area by means of isolation, and to prevent the spread of viral aerosol through air conditioning ducts, the Civil Aviation Administration of China revised and issued the eighth edition of "Preventing Spread of Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID-19) Guideline for Airports" [8,9] in September 2021.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring the Transmission Path, Influencing Factors and Risk of Aerosol Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 at Xi’an Xianyang International Airport

Zhang

Lyu

et al. 2023

IJERPH

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SARS-CoV-2 genetic sequence results collected from native COVID-19 cases who waited or saw relatives off at Xi’an Xianyang International Airport were highly consistent with the imported cases. In order to explore the routes of transmission and influencing factors that may cause the transmission of SARS-CoV-2 at the airport, a field simulation experiment of aerosol diffusion was adopted based on epidemiological survey data and a detailed field investigation of airport structure and ventilation. The results showed that the inbound passengers waited for approximately 3 h in the rest area on the first level of the international arrival area (Zone E). During the period, masks were removed for eating and drinking, resulting in the viral aerosols rising from the first level to the second level with hot air. After deplaning, the inbound passengers handled the relevant procedures and passed through the corridor on the second floor. The local side wall of the corridor adopted fan coil air conditioning, combined with fresh air supply and personnel walking, resulting in airflow flowing to Zone E. After merging with diffused air containing virus aerosol from the first floor, it continued to spread upward to the connected third-layer area. There was a local suspended ceiling on the top of the third floor, but it was approximately 4 m high and connected to the corridor from Terminal 2 to Terminal 3. When the virus aerosol diffused above the Terminal 2–Terminal 3 corridor, where the temperature was low and the air diffused downward, it could cause an infection risk for people passing through the corridor. In addition, the investigation found that the exhaust pipes of the nucleic acid sampling rooms at the international arrival corridor were directly discharged outdoors without treatment. Only one exhaust pipe and poor ventilation in the bathroom in Zone E had a risk of viral aerosol diffusion. Therefore, the international arrival area should be set up alone or separated from the other areas by hard isolation to avoid the existence of communication between different areas that could cause viral aerosols to diffuse with airflow. The toilet ventilation should be increased to avoid the accumulation of viral aerosols at high concentrations. The exhaust pipes of the toilet and the nucleic acid sampling rooms should be equipped with disinfection and efficient filtration devices, and high-altitude emission should be adopted to reduce the risk of virus aerosol diffusion.

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“…To combat the spread of coronavirus, approximately 1,512 hospitals were constructed across 363 cities in China ( 15 ). The infection surveillance and control program of COVID-19 hospitals in China was based on a closed-loop management system that effectively controlled the spread of the virus within hotels and the Olympic competition venues during the 2022 Beijing Winter Olympics ( 16 – 18 ). Closed-loop management involves controlled and isolated interactions between patients, staff, commuting routes, epidemic disposal, and logistical support to prevent the spread of COVID-19 within the closed loop, particularly to the outside community ( 19 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Assessing airborne transmission risks in COVID-19 hospitals by systematically monitoring SARS-CoV-2 in the air

Li,

Guo,

et al. 2023

Microbiol Spectr

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The continuous emergence of highly infectious SARS-CoV-2 variants with the capability of immune evasion demands more effective risk assessment and management approaches for infection prevention and control. Controlling nosocomial transmission is critical in response to the COVID-19 pandemic upon the resumption of day-to-day activities. Here, we systematically analyzed the presence of airborne SARS-CoV-2 in the isolation ward and within the contaminant, emergency, and clean zones of a designated COVID-19 hospital. A total of 359 air samples collected in the clean and emergency zones tested negative for SARS-CoV-2, demonstrating the interruption of airborne transmission in a designated COVID-19 hospital by combining the closed-loop management, unidirectional airflow, and negative pressure of isolation wards. In contrast, some air samples in the corridor outside the isolation wards tested positive for SARS-CoV-2. The leakage of virus-containing air from patient rooms to adjoining areas during rounds and meal delivery sheds light on the need for intensive and widespread virus monitoring in designated COVID-19 hospitals. In conclusion, by systematically monitoring viruses in the air, the study provides a starting point for the standardization of transmission risk management in designated hospitals for the future pandemic of a newly emerged respiratory infectious disease. IMPORTANCE Risk management and control of airborne transmission in hospitals is crucial in response to a respiratory virus pandemic. However, the formulation of these infection control measures is often based on epidemiological investigations, which are an indirect way of analyzing the transmission route of viruses. This can lead to careless omissions in infection prevention and control or excessively restrictive measures that increase the burden on healthcare workers. The study provides a starting point for standardizing transmission risk management in designated hospitals by systemically monitoring viruses in the air of typical spaces in COVID-19 hospitals. The negative results of 359 air samples in the clean and emergency zones demonstrated the existing measures to interrupt airborne transmission in a designated COVID-19 hospital. Some positive cases in the corridor of the contaminant zone during rounds and meal delivery highlighted the importance of monitoring airborne viruses for interrupting nosocomial infection.

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Targeted Prevention and Control of Key Links in Airports to Mitigate Public Health Risks

Cited by 3 publications

References 6 publications

Simulation Studies Provide Evidence of Aerosol Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in a Multi-Story Building via Air Supply, Exhaust and Sanitary Pipelines

Simulation Studies Provide Evidence of Aerosol Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 in a Multi-Story Building via Air Supply, Exhaust and Sanitary Pipelines

Exploring the Transmission Path, Influencing Factors and Risk of Aerosol Transmission of SARS-CoV-2 at Xi’an Xianyang International Airport

Assessing airborne transmission risks in COVID-19 hospitals by systematically monitoring SARS-CoV-2 in the air

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