2017
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2788740
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Targeted Information and Limited Attention

Abstract: Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in… Show more

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“…Such models of “rational inattention” include Matějka and McKay (2012), Gabaix (2014), and Persson (2017). Still other articles in the field of behavioral economics have focused on the potentially biased formation of a decision‐maker's consideration set, rather than the weighting of attributes when choosing within this set (see, e.g., Ellison and Ellison, 2009; Eliaz and Spiegler, 2011; de Clippel, Eliaz, and Rozen, 2014; Hefti and Liu, 2016).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Such models of “rational inattention” include Matějka and McKay (2012), Gabaix (2014), and Persson (2017). Still other articles in the field of behavioral economics have focused on the potentially biased formation of a decision‐maker's consideration set, rather than the weighting of attributes when choosing within this set (see, e.g., Ellison and Ellison, 2009; Eliaz and Spiegler, 2011; de Clippel, Eliaz, and Rozen, 2014; Hefti and Liu, 2016).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%