Tamper-sensitive pre-formed ReRAM-based PUFs: Methods and experimental validation

Abstract

In this paper, we present the characterization of pre-formed resistive random access memories to design physical unclonable functions and experimentally validate inherent properties such as tamper sensitivity and a self-destroy mode. The physical unclonable functions were tested for repetitive use, temperature effects, and aging. The variations during successive response generation cycles and drift rates are quantized to explore their reliability. We define tamper-sensitivity as the ability to detect tampering attacks. To establish tamper sensitivity, the cells were characterized for higher current sweeps, and the injected current at which they break down is extracted and analyzed to determine suitable operating ranges. Our experimental results show that at least 91% of the cells can generate keys protected by the scheme, while 22% of the sensing elements are triggered. Finally, the cells were characterized for high Voltage sweeps to be able to destroy the physical unclonable functions on-demand when tampering activity is detected. A fixed Voltage of 1.9 V is enough to destroy the entire array.

Post-quantum cryptographic key distribution for autonomous systems operating in contested areas

“…Testing shall be done to bring this new PUF design in compliance with NIST's qualifications of randomness. An additional layer of security can be added to this PUF through advancement of our tamper sensitivity methods, highlighted in the work of Wilson et al 16 We prescribe building a real-world implementation using the work of Wright et al 24 Their work presents an RBC error-correcting engine (see Section 2.3), which instead of sending the hash of the key to the CA, would only require that the public key is sent to the CA in order for the CA to correct for error. This is an excellent enhancement since it eliminates the transfer of sensitive information over the network, even if that sensitive information is hashed.…”