Taming Labor: Workers’ Struggles, Workplace Unionism, and Collective Bargaining on a Chinese Waterfront

Abstract

This paper draws on data acquired in semi-structured interviews to address the question of effective workplace trade unionism in China. These are rarely-sighted phenomena due to rigid prohibitions on organizing outside the Party-led All-China Federation of Trade Unions.Indeed some commentators are extinct. Evidence from a case study of the Yantian International Container Terminal suggests that this is not necessarily the case. The authors do not underestimate the very real constraints on labor organizing but rather turn the spotlight on working class power in the wider context of labor militancy and cautious trade union reform.We argue that the YICT union developed a system of annual collective bargaining in order to "tame" the power of militant dockworkers and prevent strikes. This required an effective enterprise-level trade union that was nevertheless able to manipulate members" somewhat ambiguous acceptance of its role.

Shades of Authoritarianism and State–Labour Relations in China

“…The tale of the 2010 Honda strikes and the wave of strikes that followed in its wake has been covered in the literature (Chan and Hui ; Elfstrom and Kuruvilla ; Hui ; Chang ; Lee ). Suffice it here to say that this created an opportunity for more progressive trade union leaders, labour NGOs and worker activists to initiate collective bargaining that included varying degrees of accountability via elected workers’ representatives (Pringle and Meng ). Despite post‐election co‐optation and harassment of some representatives, the idea of genuine elected worker representatives in collective bargaining was a major breakthrough in industrial relations that spread elsewhere and was infused with considerable symbolic import.…”

State and labor in China, 1978-2018

“…Significantly, the Yantian International Container Terminal trade union has “developed a system of annual collective bargaining” after the 2007 strike, as detailed by Tim Pringle and Quan Meng in their long‐term research in Shenzhen through 2013 (Pringle & Meng, , p. 1053). The elected union representatives serve dockworkers' interests to negotiate with management on a regular, not one‐off, basis .…”

A Tale of Two Deltas: Labour Politics in Jiangsu and Guangdong

“…Already in 2007, the Shenzhen Federation of Trade Unions (SZFTU) responded to a strike in the Yantian port by engaging in serious bargaining on behalf of the strikers (Pringle : ch. 3; Pringle and Meng ). In 2009, I attended a presentation in Guangzhou on efforts to bring construction workers and other especially vulnerable groups under the municipal union's umbrella.…”

“…The country's sole union, the All China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU) is designed to serve as 'a bridge and a link between the Party and masses of workers', while preempting the formation of independent organizations (on bridging, see ACFTU 2006). Despite occasional bids for greater autonomy, the union has largely stuck to this mandate (China Labour Bulletin 2009;Perry 1994;Pringle 2011;Sheehan 1998). Over the past decade, it has engaged in fitful reforms in certain parts of the country in a bid to stake out a new role for itself in China's market economy (Friedman 2014;Howell 2008;Liu 2010;Pringle 2011).…”

“…Despite occasional bids for greater autonomy, the union has largely stuck to this mandate (China Labour Bulletin 2009;Perry 1994;Pringle 2011;Sheehan 1998). Over the past decade, it has engaged in fitful reforms in certain parts of the country in a bid to stake out a new role for itself in China's market economy (Friedman 2014;Howell 2008;Liu 2010;Pringle 2011). Regulation of business and labour, meanwhile, is understood here as the full panoply of government attempts to discipline industrial relations stakeholders into obeying its policies, including via the surveillance of workplaces; legal and extra-legal punishment of individuals, organizations and firms that pose a challenge to authorities; and rewarding of compliance.…”