Talking past each other: Regional and domestic resistance in the Burundian intervention scene

Abstract

Peacebuilding attempts invoke a considerable amount of friction. In this article we argue that these frictional encounters can be made visible by focusing on articulations of resistance voiced by different actors in the intervention scene, including national elites and interveners. Departing from the discussion of the regionally led facilitation in Burundi, we show that the respective national elites and African interveners referred to different scales in order to legitimise their resistance: the Great Lakes Peace Initiative for Burundi resisted sedimented continental practices as well as international attempts to impose their conceptions of peace, whereas the Burundian elites repeatedly rejected regionally sponsored ‘solutions’ with reference to the domestic situation. Drawing on interviews with and statements by diverse national and regional forces, we show how claims to resist were articulated with respect to different spatial reference points and thereby explore how regional and domestic actors talked past each other.

What Is Our Research For? Responsibility, Humility and the Production of Knowledge about Burundi

“…The post-war Burundi scholarship often mirrored political events from that period. The peace process itself was a popular topic, including constitutional provisions and power-sharing and controversies (Vandeginste, 2009, 2011), transitional justice (Ingelaere and Kohlhagen, 2012; Samii, 2013; Vandeginste, 2012), the role of outside actors (Campbell, 2018; Curtis, 2013; Wilén and Williams, 2018; Wodrig and Grauvogel, 2016), and popular perceptions (Uvin, 2009). A number of authors have researched questions of governance, land and rural issues (Berckmoes and White, 2014; Gaynor, 2014; Nyenyezi and Ansoms, 2014; Purdeková, 2017), gender (Daley, 2007; Martin de Almagro, 2016; Saiget, 2016), the security sector (Biaumet, 2017; Nindorera, 2011; Wilén, 2016), and former armed groups including the CNDD-FDD ruling party (Alfieri, 2016; Burihabwa, 2017; Burihabwa and Curtis, 2019; Rufyikiri, 2017; Van Acker, 2016; Wittig, 2016).…”

The Global State of Democracy 2019: Addressing the Ills, Reviving the Promise

“…Each of these countries has a record of conducting regular elections which are largely flawed and uncompetitive. In other contexts, if an opposition exists it has little chance of dislodging the incumbent party from power (for more see: Temin 2017; Wodrig and Grauvogel 2016;Galvin 2018;Moore 2017).…”

“…While the referendum was approved despite strong opposition, Nkurunziza declared afterwards that he would step down in 2020 (Mikhael 2019). As a culture of impunity has reemerged in Burundi, there are mounting concerns about the resumption of a large-scale civil war (Temin 2017;Wodrig and Grauvogel 2016). This explains why, according to the GSoD Indices, Burundi scores low on all five attributes and falls firmly under the category of a non-democracy.…”

Burundi after the 2015 Elections: A Conference Report

“…In that context, the interplay between international, regional, and domestic conflict management has attracted special attention. Both regional and domestic forces laid claim to actively shaping the Burundian crisis context, thereby rendering friction almost inevitable (Wodrig and Grauvogel 2016, see also Daley 2007;Grauvogel 2015;Wodrig 2014). Curtis (2013: 72) speaks of the "peacebuilding paradox" to describe how international, regional, and local actors have produced governance arrangements in Burundi that were at odds with their inclusionary rhetoric (see also Hirblinger and Simons 2015).…”