Taking the Measure of Countermeasures: Leaders' Views on the Nation's Capacity to Develop Biodefense Countermeasures

Gilfillan, Lynne; Smith, Bradley T.; Inglesby, Thomas V.; K, Kodukula; Schuler, Ari; Lister, Mark; O’Toole, Tara

doi:10.1089/bsp.2004.2.320

Cited by 19 publications

(15 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…101 Despite the lack of significant numbers of casualties from biological weapons use, the United States government has devoted considerable resources to researching how to protect its citizens from them, spending more than $40 billion on biodefense since 2001. 102,103,104,105 Biological weapons in the hands of non-state actors are a matter of particular concern, both because they may combine relatively low start-up costs with the ability to cause mass casualties and because defending against such attacks takes significantly more resources than launching them. 106 Finally, biological weapons present policymakers with an almost unique degree of uncertainty, as expert assessments of them can vary on almost every significant factor, ranging from the motivation of attackers to use biological weapons, to the feasibility of doing so with current technology, to the specifics of what agents and targets might be selected by potential attackers.…”

Section: Policy Recommendationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

What rough beast? Synthetic biology, uncertainty, and the future of biosecurity

Mukunda¹,

Oye²,

Mohr³

2009

Politics and the Life Sciences

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Synthetic biology (SB) seeks to create modular biological parts that can be assembled into useful devices, allowing the modification of biological systems with greater reliability, at lower cost, with greater speed, and by a larger pool of people than has been the case with traditional genetic engineering. We assess the offensive and defensive security implications of SB based on the insights of leading synthetic biologists into how the technology may develop, the projections of practicing biosecurity authorities on changes in security context and on potential security applications of SB, and joint appraisals of policy-relevant sources of uncertainty. SB appears to have minimal security implications in the near term, to create modest offensive advantages in the medium term, and to strengthen defensive capabilities against natural and engineered biological threats and to enable novel potential offensive uses in the long term. To maximize defensive and minimize offensive effects of SB despite uncertainty, this essay suggests a combination of policy approaches including community-based efforts, regulation and surveillance, further research, and the deliberate design of security and safety into the technology.

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Section: Policy Recommendationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

What rough beast? Synthetic biology, uncertainty, and the future of biosecurity

Mukunda¹,

Oye²,

Mohr³

2009

Politics and the Life Sciences

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“…Natural biological agents will also certainly cause epidemics for which no countermeasure exists—as SARS did in 2003—and the current methods for producing medical countermeasures are insufficient to meet that need. In response to these concerns, there have been calls for an alternative medical countermeasure strategy to ‘one bug, one drug’ or ‘fixed’ defenses 17–19…”

Section: Challenges For Implementation Of the New Authoritiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biodefense countermeasures: the impact of Title IV of the US Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act

Gronvall¹

2008

EHTJ

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The 2006 US Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act gave the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) new authority to fund the development and procurement of medical countermeasures against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats. The legislation builds on the authority the HHS gained in 2004 under Project BioShield, which established a fund to procure medical countermeasures. This article reviews the new HHS authorities and the improvements on BioShield, and it describes some of the challenges HHS will face in exercising the new authorities to fund the development and procurement of medical countermeasures against CBRN threats.

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“…In addition, the shortage of high-containment laboratory facilities capable of running animal efficacy tests lengthens the countermeasure development process, increasing financial risk. 44 …”

Section: Sbirmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anthrax Countermeasures: Current Status and Future Needs

Borio

Grönvall

2005

Biosecurity and Bioterrorism: Biodefense Strategy, Practice, an

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The U.S. government does not yet have the range of medical countermeasures needed to protect its citizens from anthrax and other potential bioweapons. In the event of an anthrax attack, treatment interventions in addition to antibiotics would be needed so that very ill patients can be treated and clean-up crews can be better protected, especially if an engineered strain is used. This article describes specific anthrax countermeasures that are in development, barriers to development, and potential mechanisms the government could use to accelerate the movement of these countermeasures through the pipeline. A key challenge will be to encourage the transition of promising leads from basic research to the product development stage, when they may qualify for BioShield funds.

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Taking the Measure of Countermeasures: Leaders' Views on the Nation's Capacity to Develop Biodefense Countermeasures

Cited by 19 publications

References 2 publications

What rough beast? Synthetic biology, uncertainty, and the future of biosecurity

What rough beast? Synthetic biology, uncertainty, and the future of biosecurity

Biodefense countermeasures: the impact of Title IV of the US Pandemic and All-Hazards Preparedness Act

Anthrax Countermeasures: Current Status and Future Needs

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