Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation

Tribe, Laurence H.

doi:10.2307/1341856

Cited by 42 publications

(13 citation statements)

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“…A substantial legal literature has emerged asking whether, in fact, the president is unconstrained in his choice. While some have argued, on legal or normative grounds, that the president should limit reliance on executive agreements so that Congress is not bypassed (Tribe 1995), in practice the “doctrine of full interchangeability” has prevailed (Ackerman and Golove 1995; Yoo 2001, 759) 5 . This doctrine means that all international agreements have the same standing in domestic courts, regardless of the ratification procedure.…”

Section: Literature and Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices

Martin

2005

Pres Stud Q

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U.S. presidents can choose the form of international agreements that they negotiate. Using the Constitution's Article II procedure to gain ratification of a formal treaty is a costly and time‐consuming endeavor, so presidents frequently turn to executive agreements that do not require approval by two thirds of the Senate. Given this alternative, why do presidents ever choose the Article II procedure? This article argues that treaties serve as a costly signal of intent to comply with the terms of international agreements. The choice between treaties and executive agreements is therefore a strategic executive decision that takes into account the anticipated reactions of other states. A signaling model predicts that high‐benefit agreements should take the form of treaties. The predictions of purely domestic models of a positive relationship between the reliability of a government and the probability that an agreement is a treaty should not hold. These propositions are tested on a large data set of U.S. international agreements between 1980 and 1999.

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Section: Literature and Motivationmentioning

confidence: 99%

The President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices

Martin

2005

Pres Stud Q

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“…He agreed with their assessment of the early period but resisted their conclusion that events of the twentieth century were sufficient to overcome the text and structure of the Constitution, which, Tribe argued, implied that the treaty process is the exclusive means by which the United States may enter major international agreements with congressional participation. 55 It is not clear who had the better of this argument. Ackerman and Golove were correct that, as a matter of positive law, the United States and foreign sovereigns accept that the United States may validly enter into binding international agreements by opting for the congressionalagreement process rather than the treaty process.…”

Section: Congressional-executive Agreementsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Senators’ Letter to Iran and Domestic Incorporation of International Law

Dorf¹

2016

Political Science Quarterly

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“…The tribunals have since operated in accordance with the FTC's interpretive note, but this move has not gone unchallenged 7 . As for the FTC's authority to modify technical provisions such as the classification of products for origin determination or the schedule for tariff elimination, such modifications remain subject to the implementation procedures that apply in each state (U.S. Congress, House of Representatives, 1993: sec.…”

Section: Current Lack Of Rule‐making Capability In Nafta and The Sppmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…9 9 The argument proposing that NAFTA, because of its scope, should have been ratified as an Article II treaty and should therefore be considered unconstitutional has been defended by prominent law scholars and been brought, without success, before the courts (see Ackerman & Golove, 1995; Tribe, 1995). …”

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confidence: 99%

Governing the North American Free Trade Area: International Rule Making and Delegation in NAFTA, the SPP, and Beyond

Bélanger

2010

Latin American Policy

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The North American free trade area appears to have reached an impasse. Deprived of adequate rule‐making mechanisms, it is facing an institutional deficit that hinders its competitivenes, but any form of European‐style supranationalism has unequivocally been ruled out as a conceivable way to administer the economic zone created more than 15 years ago by the North American Free Trade Agreement. Should, therefore, North Americans abandon any prospect of deeper economic integration and even expect a relative decline in free trade in the region? Not necessarily, because supranationalism is not in any way a necessary condition for effective international rule making. The key ingredient for effective international rule making is not the external delegation of authority, but rather the level of domestic executive autonomy states are able to pool and coordinate through often sophisticated, but not necessarily legally binding, international institutions. On this account, this article evaluates the potential of the recent Security and Prosperity Partnership of North America (SPP) and concludes that it amalgamates enough executive autonomy to constitute a basis for the establishment of a nontreaty, international rule‐making body. After looking at examples of international rule‐making bodies to which the United States is a party and that share key institutional features of the SPP, the article suggests paths by which the three governments could upgrade the SPP design in such a way as to provide the North American free trade area with the flexible rule‐making capability it needs. La zona de libre comercio de Norteamérica parece haber llegado a un callejón sin salida. A falta de los mecanismos adecuados para crear organismos reglamentarios, enfrenta un déficit institucional que entorpece su competitividad. Sin embargo, cualquier forma de supra‐nacionalismo al estilo europeo ha quedado sin duda descartada como una alternativa viable para administrar la zona económica creada hace más de quince años por el TLCAN. ¿Deberían entonces los miembros de Norte América abandonar cualquier esperanza de una integración más profunda, y hasta esperar una contracción del libre comercio en la región? No necesariamente, ya que el supranacionalismo no es de ninguna manera condición necesaria para la generación eficaz de mecanismos reglamentarios. El principal ingrediente para instaurar un organismo reglamentario eficaz, no depende de la delegación de autoridad a un ente externo, sino del nivel de autonomía del poder ejecutivo que los estados estén dispuestos a obtener y coordinar mediante instituciones muchas veces sofisticadas, aunque no necesariamente con poder de obligatoriedad jurídica. Al respecto, este artículo evalúa el potencial de la reciente Alianza para la Seguridad y la Prosperidad de América del Norte (ASPAN), y concluye que dicha institución amalgama la suficiente autonomía del poder ejecutivo como para constituir el fundamento, sin tener que formalizarlo en un tratado, de un cuerpo reglamentario a nivel internacional. Luego de cons...

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Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation

Cited by 42 publications

References 0 publications

The President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices

The President and International Commitments: Treaties as Signaling Devices

The Senators’ Letter to Iran and Domestic Incorporation of International Law

Governing the North American Free Trade Area: International Rule Making and Delegation in NAFTA, the SPP, and Beyond

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