Taking Power

Abstract

Taking Power analyzes the causes behind some three dozen revolutions in the Third World between 1910 and the present. It advances a theory that seeks to integrate the political, economic, and cultural factors that brought these revolutions about, and links structural theorizing with original ideas on culture and agency. It attempts to explain why so few revolutions have succeeded, while so many have failed. The book is divided into chapters that treat particular sets of revolutions including the great social revolutions of Mexico 1910, China 1949, Cuba 1959, Iran 1979, and Nicaragua 1979, the anticolonial revolutions in Algeria, Vietnam, Angola, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe from the 1940s to the 1970s, and the failed revolutionary attempts in El Salvador, Peru, and elsewhere. It closes with speculation about the future of revolutions in an age of globalization, with special attention to Chiapas, the post-September 11 world, and the global justice movement.

Yemen: Between Revolution and Regression

“…4 Foran elaborated this difference by identifying five causal factors necessary for successful revolutionary outcomes: '1) dependent development, 2) a repressive, exclusionary, personalist state; 3) the elaboration of effective and powerful political cultures of opposition; and a Studies in Conflict & Terrorism revolutionary crisis consisting of 4) an economic downturn and 5) a world-systemic opening'. 5 Accordingly, a different combination of these factors precipitates fundamentally different outcomes, ranging from rebellion or political revolution on one side of the spectrum to failure, reversal, or non-attempts on the other.…”

“…Additionally, this style of ruler is typically adept at employing various coercive methods to control its citizenry and ensure the regimes longevity, at least for a time. 9 In doing so, personalist rulers -the type most vulnerable to revolutionfacilitate the formation of broad multi-class revolutionary coalitions. The combination of dependent development and personalist style of rule, however, is not enough to precipitate a revolutionary outcome, as many such rulers are never overthrown and others exit their position in ways that do not produce the necessary societal and structural change.…”

“…Political cultures of opposition draw Studies in Conflict & Terrorism upon shared grievances, cultural idioms, and ideology to mobilize collective action against the state. 11 The effectiveness of a political culture of opposition can mean the difference between a mere rebellion by a small but aggrieved segment of society and a revolutionary project undertaken by a vast portion of a state's citizenry. While these three causal factors -dependent development, personalist rule, and effective political culture of opposition -may be enough to spark a revolutionary situation, they are not enough to ensure a successful outcome.…”

Revolution, Nonviolence, and the Arab Uprisings*

“…Research highlights three main factors that lead to the emergence of revolutionary situations: changes in international relations, such as degrees of dependent development, shifting client-patron networks, and the emergence of novel transnational discursive fields (Goldfrank 1979;Skocpol 1979;Hobsbawm 1986;Halliday 1999;Lawson 2004Lawson , 2015Adamson 2005;Foran 2005;Beck 2011;Tarrow 2012;Goldstone 2014a;Ritter 2015); the vulnerability of certain types of regime, particularly neo-patrimonial orders that combine personalized rule with a degree of legal-rational functioning (Eisenstadt 1973;Mann 1984;Chehabi and Linz eds. 1998;Goodwin 2001;Goldstone 2009;Bunce and Wolchik 2011); and a systemic crisis rooted in a conjuncture of political-coercive, (relative) economic, and symbolic crisis (Halliday 1999;Goldstone 2003;Lawson 2004;Foran 2005;Goldstone 2014a). However, revolutionary situations rarely lead to successful revolutions.…”

“…However, revolutionary situations rarely lead to successful revolutions. Again, research highlights three main dynamics that lie behind successful revolutions: levels of state effectiveness (Goldstone 1991(Goldstone , 2001(Goldstone , 2003Goodwin 2001;Foran 2005); the hold of an elite over the coercive apparatus (Russell 1974;Moore 1978;Tilly 1978Tilly , 1995Goldstone 1991;Bellin 2012;Nepstad 2013); and the organizational coherence of an opposition through the use of 'social technologies' ranging from revolutionary stories to networks of social movements, political parties, labor organizations, and places of worship (Tilly 2006(Tilly , 2008Selbin 2010;Alexander 2011;Tarrow 2012). …”