Taking Due Care: Moral Obligations in Dual Use Research

Abstract

In the past decade, the perception of a bioterrorist threat has increased and created a demand on life scientists to consider the potential security implications of dual use research. This article examines a selection of proposed moral obligations for life scientists that have emerged to meet these concerns and the extent to which they can be considered reasonable. It also describes the underlying reasons for the concerns, how they are managed, and their implications for scientific values. Five criteria for what constitutes preventable harm are suggested and a number of proposed obligations for life scientists are considered against these criteria, namely, the obligations to prevent bioterrorism; to engage in response activities; to consider negative implications of research; not to publish or share sensitive information; to oversee and limit access to dangerous material; and to report activities of concern. Although bioterrorism might be perceived as an imminent threat, the analysis illustrates that this is beyond the responsibility of life scientists either to prevent or to respond to. Among the more reasonable obligations are duties to consider potential negative implications of one's research, protect access to sensitive material, technology and knowledge, and report activities of concern. Responsibility, therefore, includes obligations concerned with preventing foreseeable and highly probable harm. A central conclusion is that several of the proposed obligations are reasonable, although not unconditionally.

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“…Moreover, scientists conducting DURC reviews must be aware that their determinations are subject to the kinds of mistakes that we pointed out. Should they then err on the side of caution or not is a difficult question that should receive close scrutiny (8, 9). …”

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“…A paradigm case of dual use risk in bioscience is research into infectious diseases, which involves modifying select agents to respond to outbreaks. Select agents like the Avian influenza virus, the Ebola virus and the Bacillus anthracis (anthrax) pose a severe threat to the public as they can be used to produce bioterrorist weapons 25 26. Basic research into sexual orientation poses a dual use risk insofar as, on the one hand, gaining scientific understanding of sexual orientation is beneficial; on the other hand, the findings could be used to produce reorientation technologies—a bad outcome given the four kinds of harms previously identified.…”

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“…While the recommendation of not assigning sole responsibility to individual scientists is shared by Kuhlau et al (2008), they point out that the moral duty to prevent harm on the part of an individual researcher does exist and includes both intentional and unintentional harm. Furthermore, such moral duty linked to the professional role of the researcher carries with it a requirement for an ‘awareness of relevant regulation and potential dangers’ (Kuhlau et al 2008: 481).…”

“…Furthermore, such moral duty linked to the professional role of the researcher carries with it a requirement for an ‘awareness of relevant regulation and potential dangers’ (Kuhlau et al 2008: 481). This awareness in turn, ‘entails a continuous process of reviewing one’s work in a wider context.’ Based on this reasoning they identify five criteria for the obligation to prevent harm.

‘In order to take social responsibility and due care, life scientists should strive to prevent harm that is: Within their professional responsibility… Within their professional capacity and ability… Reasonably foreseeable… Proportionally greater than the benefits… [and] Not more easily achieved by other means…’ (Kuhlau et al 2008: 481f.

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“…‘In order to take social responsibility and due care, life scientists should strive to prevent harm that is: Within their professional responsibility… Within their professional capacity and ability… Reasonably foreseeable… Proportionally greater than the benefits… [and] Not more easily achieved by other means…’ (Kuhlau et al 2008: 481f. )…”