Tacit Networks, Heterogeneous Engineers, and Embodied Technology

Abstract

Social studies of science and technology are dominated by action and macro approaches. This has led to a neglect of institutions and institutional arrangements at the meso level, which are important, in particular to the student of technology. The transfer of concepts and methods from social studies of science to technology studies has conserved this lack of concern with the meso level. This article suggests a more critical evaluation of this transfer, along with a review of the now popular assumption of a high degree of similarity between science and technology. Two case studies show how meso-level considerations are important to an understanding of the nature of technological innovation and illustrate the lack of similarity between scientific and technological development.

Innovation in IT firms: An investigation of intramural and extramural R&D activities and their impact

“…Later more complex assessments have emerged that have highlighted the importance of social and institutional factors that stimulate innovation (Sorensen & Levold, 1992). King et al (1994) have posited that in any economic scenario and any geography, the decisions taken by the management of the firm deeply impact the innovation outcomes.…”

Tacit Knowledge, Innovation and Economic Geography

“…These unintended transfers, where the owners of such knowledge cannot prevent others from making use of it (Grossman and Helpman, 1991, pp. 15-16), include: departure of key scientists and engineers (including poaching of key staff); informal know-how sharing (von Hippel, 1987Hippel, , 1990; unintended signalling of key information at conferences and workshops; membership of 'invisible colleges' and research schools (Olesko, 1993, p. 16) and professional links associated with speci c 'communities of practice' (Lave and Wenger, 1991;Barley, 1996) related to membership of professional associations or informal groupings (see, for example, Sørensen and Levold, 1992); and unintended leakage by consultants or design practices of information picked up from one client and applied to others.…”

Radical Uncertainty in Scientific Discovery Work

“…Other studies report cases where even the same individuals (1) cannot reproduce what they have succeeded in doing before and (2) do not know why they fail. For example, the engineers of a company that specialized in offshore research and development designed and built a machine but failed to produce a second one; this happened although their original machine was still working perfectly for the customer (Sørensen and Levold 1992).…”