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Norden, Jörg van

doi:10.1007/978-3-86226-499-5_10

Cited by 3 publications

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“…But recall that the Kun was not capable of flying like the Peng, either-until its 'transformation.'" 42 The small flying animals should not be blamed for not being capable to fly like Peng, but it seems legitimate to criticize them for downgrading Peng's vital conditions instead of appreciating or, at least, accepting them despite their differences. With their laugh, the small flying creatures demonstrate that they have formed semiconscious adaptive preferences.…”

Section: 大之辯也。 40mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…43 In the vein of what Van Norden suggests, perhaps we could even criticize the small animals for not attempting to instigate a similar transformation in their own lives: "because of the narrow perspective that leads them to ridicule the Peng, they lead narrow lives." 44 Here is where an analysis of the words "transformation" (hua 化) and "anger/ exertion" (nu 怒) that appear in the story becomes important. Most commonly, we read hua in a passive mode: a transformation that happens to the fish Kun as a result of a process that it does not initiate.…”

Section: 大之辯也。 40mentioning

confidence: 99%

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The happy slave isn't free: Relational autonomy and freedom in theZhuangzi

Valmisa

2019

Philosophy Compass

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This paper challenges the view that contentment leads to personal freedom and autonomy and argues for a relational and exercise concept of de facto freedom in the Zhuangzi 莊子. I first review influential interpretations of freedom in the Zhuangzi that equate freedom with contentment and nonfrustration, starting with Guo Xiang's 郭象 (d. 312 CE). By putting these interpretations in dialog with contemporary social philosophy (Christman, Meyers, Pettit, Elster, and Khader), I reflect on the two seminal problems of the psychologizing causal and procedural approaches that allow the interpretation of freedom as contentment: the “happy slave” problem and the “sour grapes” problem. Proving this account of freedom inadequate, I argue for a different interpretation of freedom in the Zhuangzi that resembles a weakly substantive and constitutive account of freedom and autonomy in modern‐day social philosophy terms, such as Marina Oshana's. The theory of freedom that I analyze in the Zhuangzi, however, helps us correct the risk of material determinism of the constitutive account, offering a description of relational freedom and autonomy as constituted by socio‐material conditions but not determined by them.

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Section: 大之辯也。 40mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: 大之辯也。 40mentioning

confidence: 99%

The happy slave isn't free: Relational autonomy and freedom in theZhuangzi

Valmisa

2019

Philosophy Compass

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“…18 Since ren is the summation of human virtue, one's ability to practice it will have the largest effect on one's ability to follow the Dao. 19 In fact, the Mengzi explicitly articulates that "The Way [Dao] is simply to harmonize with benevolence [ren] and put it into words." 20 Therefore, in light of what Confucius said in the Analects, a Confucian society should promote a strict adherence to ritual propriety (li).…”

Section: The Cultivation Of Virtue and Second Generation Rightsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does The Dao Support Individual Autonomy And Human Rights?

Carr¹

2018

stance

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The Universal Declaration of Human Rights lists what have come to be called “first” and “second” generation rights. First generation rights are civil and political; second generation rights are social, economic, and cultural. Western and Asian nations are in disagreement about whether each of these rights is universal. While Western nations strongly believe that first generation rights should be universal, many “Confucian” nations insist that second generation rights precede first generation rights. After analyzing the Confucian values in detail, I conclude that Confucianism supports both generations of rights.

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“…There thus seems to be a dis-analogy between (G4) and the other gauges. 18 By itself, this is not a problem since nothing said so far implies that the Mohists are not interested in descriptions of facts. If anything, the presence of (G4) suggests that the Mohists do not conceive of the nature and function of language in purely pragmatic terms totally detached from concerns of truth.…”

Section: Way and Truthmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Word and the Way in Mozi

Loy

2011

Philosophy Compass

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According to A. C. Graham, ‘the crucial question’ for the early Chinese thinkers was ‘Where is the Way [dao]?’–‘the way to order the state and conduct personal life’ rather than ‘What is the Truth?’1 This observation is most apt when applied to the thinking of Mozi (flor. ca. fifth century to early fourth century BCE) and his followers (the ‘Mohists’) as it is exemplified in the ethical and political chapters of the eponymously named text (Mozi Chapters 1–39, 46–51).2 A striking feature of the Mohists’ thinking, however, is the concern they have with yan (‘sayings’, ‘speeches’, ‘words’, ‘discourses’), and the role they assigned to yan in their ethical project. Part I of this article will outline the nature and scope of the Mohists’ concern with yan. In the Mohists’ conception, right yan is the linguistic counterpart to proper dao. And conduct that follows dao is a matter of affirming the right yan and taking it as a model in one’s actions. The Mohists’ concern with yan is prominently exhibited in their proposing objective standards, or ‘gauges’, by means of which any yan may be assessed. Part II introduces these gauges and discusses how they function as standards for right yan and right conduct. Given the generally pragmatic outlook of their thinking, the question remains as to whether, in their conception of yan, the Mohists conceived of language exclusively in terms of its action guiding function, and whether they deployed the notion of truth at all. Part III discusses this issue, arguing that there is a minimal sense in which yan that are positively assessed by the gauges are true, and that the Mohists are not insensitive to the distinction between descriptive as opposed to action guiding uses of language. Part IV briefly discusses how the Mohists’ attitude towards yan contrasts with those of early Confucian and Daoist thinkers.

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Cited by 3 publications

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The happy slave isn't free: Relational autonomy and freedom in theZhuangzi

The happy slave isn't free: Relational autonomy and freedom in theZhuangzi

Does The Dao Support Individual Autonomy And Human Rights?

The Word and the Way in Mozi

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