2015
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.2742498
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Systemic Risk, Corporate Governance and Regulation of Banks Across Emerging Countries

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Cited by 7 publications
(9 citation statements)
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“…Using a cross-country sample from 48 countries, Laeven and Levine (2009) show that the relationship between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities can be either positive or negative depending on the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Andries and Nistor (2016) provide similar evidence from ten Central Eastern European (CEE) countries, concluding that the impact of corporate governance policies on systemic risk is affected by the tightness of three types of regulations, namely supervisory power, capital requirements and activity restrictions. Finally, using data from 54 countries, De Vita and Luo (2018) conclude that with the exception of capital requirements, other tools that relate to the pillars of Basel II, namely market discipline and supervisory power are unable to mitigate the propensity to greater risk-taking by banks resulting from larger board size, higher board independence and greater gender diversity of the board.…”
Section: Review Of Related Studiesmentioning
confidence: 78%
“…Using a cross-country sample from 48 countries, Laeven and Levine (2009) show that the relationship between bank risk and capital regulations, deposit insurance policies, and restrictions on bank activities can be either positive or negative depending on the comparative power of shareholders within the corporate governance structure of each bank. Andries and Nistor (2016) provide similar evidence from ten Central Eastern European (CEE) countries, concluding that the impact of corporate governance policies on systemic risk is affected by the tightness of three types of regulations, namely supervisory power, capital requirements and activity restrictions. Finally, using data from 54 countries, De Vita and Luo (2018) conclude that with the exception of capital requirements, other tools that relate to the pillars of Basel II, namely market discipline and supervisory power are unable to mitigate the propensity to greater risk-taking by banks resulting from larger board size, higher board independence and greater gender diversity of the board.…”
Section: Review Of Related Studiesmentioning
confidence: 78%
“…Capital Adequacy Ratio was initially considered as measure of leverage but due to little variation among the listed banks it is replaced by Leverage Ratio. In the similar vein, the extant literature on systemic risk also highlights extensive use of leverage ratios (Andries & Mutu, 2016;Liu & Zhong, 2017).…”
Section: Determinants Of Systemic Riskmentioning
confidence: 97%
“…Though not contractually obliged to do so, it is generally accepted that firms are reluctant to cut dividends due to the adverse signal that it transmits to the investment community (Brav et al, 2005). 11 Therefore, a greater number of dividend payers is likely to require a greater proportion of cash resources and thus reduce cash available for other system-wide activities. Furthermore, the IMF (2019) reports an increasing tendency for firms to fund dividend payouts by borrowing.…”
Section: Identifying Characteristics Of Systemically Risk Firmsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Other key determinants of systemic risk for banks is the level of undercapitalisation (Laeven, Ratnovski and Tong, 2016), leverage and market-to-book value (Calluzzo and Dong, 2015), the level 1 Other measures rely on CDS data, e.g. Huang, Zhou and Zhu (2009), Giglio (2011) and Nijskens and Wagner (2011); interbank market data as in Giratis of interconnectedness with the rest of the financial system (Bostandzic and Weiß, 2018) and corporate governance (Iqbal, Strobl and Vahamaa, 2015;Andries and Nistor, 2016;and Anginer et al, 2018).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%