Staggered bioterrorist attacks with aerosolized pathogens on population centers present a formidable challenge to resource allocation and response planning. The response and planning will commence immediately after the detection of the f rst attack and with no or little information of the second attack. In this report, we outline a method by which resource allocation may be performed. It involves probabilistic reconstruction of the bioterrorist attack from partial observations of the outbreak, followed by an optimization-under-uncertainty approach to perform resource allocations. We consider both single-site and time-staggered multi-site attacks (i.e., a reload scenario) under conditions when resources (personnel and equipment which are diff cult to gather and transport) are insuff cient. Both communicable (plague) and non-communicable diseases (anthrax) are addressed, and we also consider cases when the data, the time-series of people reporting with symptoms, are confounded with a reporting delay. We demonstrate how our approach develops allocations prof les that have the potential to reduce the probability of an extremely adverse outcome in exchange for a more certain, but less adverse outcome. We explore the effect of placing limits on daily allocations. Further, since our method is data-driven, the resource allocation progressively improves as more data becomes available.