System Studies for Global Nuclear Assurance &amp; Security: 3S Risk Analysis for Small Modular Reactors (Volume I)—Technical Evaluation of Safety Safeguards &amp; Security

Williams, Adam David; Osborn, Douglas; Bland, Jesse John; Cardoni, Jeffrey N; Cohn, Brian; Faucett, Christopher; Gilbert, Luke J.; Haddal, Risa; Horowitz, Steven J.; Majedi, Mike; Snell, Mark K.

doi:10.2172/1489621

Cited by 2 publications

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“…In a "3S" risk analysis for SMRs, Sandia National Laboratories System Studies for Global Nuclear Assurance & Security [45], experts studied the interdependencies between safety, safeguard, and security. Using a hypothetical SMR facility and generic DBT, the experts used the DEPO methodology (Figure 2) to analyze the result comparing low, medium, and high security budgets.…”

Section: Source: Badwan Et Al(2015) [43]mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…[45]. According to the Sandia National Laboratories website, one operator can use multiple weapons, and the systems can reduce operator inaccuracy and fatigue making it more efficient and effective in neutralizing adversaries [51].There are serious concerns raised on the use of lethal autonomous weapons systems referred to as Lethal Autonomous Robots (aka LARs or Killer robots)[52].…”

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confidence: 99%

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Small Modular Reactors and Advanced Reactor Security: Regulatory Perspectives on Integrating Physical and Cyber Security by Design to Protect Against Malicious Acts and Evolving Threats

Duguay¹

2020

International Journal of Nuclear Security

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Section: Source: Badwan Et Al(2015) [43]mentioning

confidence: 99%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Small Modular Reactors and Advanced Reactor Security: Regulatory Perspectives on Integrating Physical and Cyber Security by Design to Protect Against Malicious Acts and Evolving Threats

Duguay¹

2020

International Journal of Nuclear Security

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Systems Theory Principles and Complex Systems Engineering Concepts for Protection and Resilience in Critical Infrastructure: Lessons from the Nuclear Sector

Williams¹

2020

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Part of the Presidential Policy Directive 21 (PPD‐21) (PPD 2013) mandate includes evaluating safety, security, and safeguards (or nonproliferation) mechanisms traditionally implemented within the nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector of critical infrastructure—including a complex, dynamic set of risks and threats within an all‐hazards approach. In response, research out of Sandia National Laboratories (Sandia) explores the ability of systems theory principles (hierarchy and emergence) and complex systems engineering concepts (multidomain interdependence) to better understand and address these risks and threats. This Sandia research explores the safety, safeguards, and security risks of three different nuclear sector‐related activities—spent nuclear fuel transportation, small modular reactors, and portable nuclear power reactors—to investigate the complex and dynamic risk related to the PPD‐21‐mandated all‐hazards approach. This research showed that a systems‐theoretic approach can better identify inter‐dependencies, conflicts, gaps, and leverage points across traditional safety, security, and safeguards hazard mitigation strategies in the nuclear reactors, materials, and waste sector. As a result, mitigation strategies from applying systems theoretic principles and complex systems engineering concepts can be (1) designed to better capture interdependencies, (2) implemented to better align with real‐world operational uncertainties, and (3) evaluated as a systems‐level whole to better identify, characterize, and manage PPD‐21's all hazards strategies.

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System Studies for Global Nuclear Assurance & Security: 3S Risk Analysis for Small Modular Reactors (Volume I)—Technical Evaluation of Safety Safeguards & Security

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Small Modular Reactors and Advanced Reactor Security: Regulatory Perspectives on Integrating Physical and Cyber Security by Design to Protect Against Malicious Acts and Evolving Threats

Small Modular Reactors and Advanced Reactor Security: Regulatory Perspectives on Integrating Physical and Cyber Security by Design to Protect Against Malicious Acts and Evolving Threats

Systems Theory Principles and Complex Systems Engineering Concepts for Protection and Resilience in Critical Infrastructure: Lessons from the Nuclear Sector

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