Syria and Turkey in Water Diplomacy (1962–2003)

Daoudy, Marwa

doi:10.1007/978-3-662-10866-6_27

Cited by 17 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…Prior to 1960, hydropolitical relations regarding the Two Rivers among the three littoral states could be characterized as harmonious [73]. Since then, their relations have become tense, especially after Turkey implemented the Southeastern Anatolia Project or Guneydogu Anadolu Projesi (GAP) aimed at harvesting water for irrigation, hydroelectric energy, and addressing its Kurdish ethno-political concerns through the building of 22 dams and 19 hydropower plants on the Two Rivers [59,60,74]. According to international experts, a full implementation of the GAP will ultimately withdraw a maximum of 70% and 50% of the natural runoff of the Euphrates and Tigris Rivers, respectively [60].…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, the negotiation process is not necessarily based on the background of power symmetry [56], in the sense that agents likely have heterogeneous social, economic, political, and military positions that will inevitably influence the final negotiation outcome [57]. Asymmetry in power is a fundamental aspect of hydro-politics, which is one key element for conflict resolution in transboundary water governance [58,59]. Although asymmetrical powers between agents do not necessarily determine the results of negotiations, the overall benefits lie in the hands of the most powerful agent [60].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although asymmetrical powers between agents do not necessarily determine the results of negotiations, the overall benefits lie in the hands of the most powerful agent [60]. Therefore, the agents’ bargaining powers should be taken into account in river-sharing problems when available [28,55,56,58,59,60,61,62,63,64], as they help create a more realistic negotiation analysis [28]. The asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (ANBS) [65], generalized by the Nash bargaining solution [43], proved to be suitable for describing the agents’ asymmetrical negotiation powers through bargaining weights, and ensuring mutually beneficial resolutions for water-sharing problems.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Asymmetric Bargaining Model for Water Resource Allocation over Transboundary Rivers

Qin

Peng

et al. 2019

IJERPH

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Sustainable transboundary water governance is often challenged by conflicts between agents, which necessitates the design of cooperative and self-enforcing alternatives to facilitate equitable water distribution. The Nash bargaining approach, which originated from game theory, could offer a good mathematical framework to simulate strategic interactions among involved agents by considering individual rational benefits. Given that river-sharing problems often involve multiple self-interested agents, the asymmetric Nash bargaining solution (ANBS) could be used to describe agents’ powers, as determined by disparate social, economic, and political as well as military status, and ensure win–win strategies based on individual rationality. This paper proposed an asymmetric bargaining model by combining multi-criteria decision making, bankruptcy theory, and the ANBS for water distribution in the transboundary river context. The Euphrates River Basin (ERB) with three littoral states was used as a case study. Turkey has the highest bargaining power in ERB negotiation since it dominates in terms of economic strength, political influence, and military capacity, whereas in the two downstream countries these aspects are limited due to their internal political fragmentation and weaker military status. The water satisfaction percentages of Turkey, Syria, and Iraq under the best alternative are 96.30%, 84.23%, and 40.88%, respectively. The findings highlight the necessity for synthetically considering the agent’s disagreement utility and asymmetrical power when negotiating over water allocation.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Asymmetric Bargaining Model for Water Resource Allocation over Transboundary Rivers

Qin

Peng

et al. 2019

IJERPH

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“…One key element of trans-boundary water conflict that should also be considered in water disputes is the impact of asymmetry, asymmetry in power being a fundamental aspect of hydro-politics (Daoudy 2004). Asymmetry in political, military, economic, etc.…”

Section: Hydro-hegemonymentioning

confidence: 99%

Trans-boundary River Basin Management: Factors Influencing the Success or Failure of International Agreements

Mianabadi

Mostert

Giesen

2015

Conflict Resolution in Water Resources and Environmental Management

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Water is an environmental, political, cultural, historical, and economic natural resource that is of vital importance for human life. As many water resources are shared by more than one country and since there is no substitute for water, water has become a security issue. In this paper, we provide an overview of the factors that may potentially increase conflict among riparian countries and affect the success or failure of international agreements in addressing trans-boundary water management issues. Additional insight into these factors can assist in designing resilient water treaties, decrease the likelihood of the collapse of international water agreements, and consequently decrease the potential for conflicts among riparian countries.

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“…The resulting de facto ‘arrangement’ between hegemons and nonhegemons brings order and stability. From a realist perspective, hegemons set the rules of international relations and maintain the status quo in their constellation , while disgruntled actors may oppose the rules or the status quo ; Turton and Funke and Daoudy have most clearly represented this realist strand. While realism is mostly focused on military power and violent conflict, some realists consider soft (especially economic) power as well as hard power necessary to be hegemonic.…”

Section: Issue 1: State‐centricity and The Territorial Trapmentioning

confidence: 99%

Transboundary ‘hydro‐hegemony’: 10 years later

Warner¹,

Mirumachi

Farnum

et al. 2017

WIREs Water

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This article places the theorization and analysis of hydro-hegemony in the context of the scholarship on transboundary water conflict and cooperation. We discuss critiques, developments, and debates in this domain over the past 10 years, focusing particularly on the contributions of the London Water Research Group, showing how thinking on the theorization and analysis of hydro-hegemony-and hydropolitics-has moved beyond the state-centricity, the tendency to see hegemony as solely negative, and the conceptually hegemonic potential of hydrohegemony itself. Various strands of international relations theory (realism, neoinstitutionalism, critical theory) have left their mark on the London School. Intense interaction between analysts and pragmatic practitioners is found to invite (or incite) eclecticism as well as promote vibrancy.

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Syria and Turkey in Water Diplomacy (1962–2003)

Cited by 17 publications

References 3 publications

Asymmetric Bargaining Model for Water Resource Allocation over Transboundary Rivers

Asymmetric Bargaining Model for Water Resource Allocation over Transboundary Rivers

Trans-boundary River Basin Management: Factors Influencing the Success or Failure of International Agreements

Transboundary ‘hydro‐hegemony’: 10 years later

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