Synthetic Intelligence: Beyond Artificial Intelligence and Robotics

Granting legal personhood to artificial intelligence systems and traditional veil-piercing concepts to impose liability

“…Perhaps our understanding of sentience would have to evolve to take into account developments of "sentience" in artificial intelligence systems, i.e. what is popularly known as "synthetic intelligence" (Lindley 2012). Recognising engineered intelligence and conferring them the status of an entity under law would allow it to independently bear the liability for the damage caused by it.…”

Neurobiological Computation and Synthetic Intelligence

“…However, both cognitive and neural simulations have had limited success to date and certainly fall far short of HLI. Lindley [12] has argued that cognitive approaches in particular do not appear to be promising in isolation. Here it may be added that an essential problem for cognitivist AI is an implicit Cartesian dualism, where AI has focussed upon modelling the mind, and the symbol grounding problem, a central problem for AI, is the computationalist's version of the problem for dualists of the nature of the ‗mechanism' by which the mind and the body interact.…”

“…While this approach may lead to systems that can pass the Turing test within limited contexts, as a general paradigm of intelligence it are severe limitations, as summarised by Lindley [12]. Indeed, following the argument of [12], not only is the Turing test limited to symbolic discourse, the foundation of Turing's challenge, computing machinery, is a narrow and historically situated understanding of machines.…”

“…Indeed, following the argument of [12], not only is the Turing test limited to symbolic discourse, the foundation of Turing's challenge, computing machinery, is a narrow and historically situated understanding of machines. In the age of nanotechnology and biotechnology, the distinction between 1 School of Computing Science, Blekinge Institute of Technology, SE-371 79 Karlskrona, Sweden.…”

“…Moreover, the pursuit of SI immediately raises the question of how well we understand neurobiology. One of the issues to consider in this is the degree to which our understanding of neurobiology is conditioned by historically situated metaphors and current technologies, just as [12] describes the metaphorical construction of AI in terms of intelligence as computation, and of robotics as the reinvention of the (typically) human form in the media of twentieth century electromechanical engineering technologies. This paper considers the more specific question of the nature and role of information processing in understanding the functions of neurobiology, especially those functions that may appear most relevant to the realisation of HLI, and the implications of this for how SI may be achieved.…”