Synthesis of diagnostic techniques based on an IEC 61508-aware metamodel

Sojer, Dominik; Knoll, Alois; Buckl, Christian

doi:10.1109/sies.2011.5953680

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 3 publications

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“…FTOS allows modeling of failure modes of components and their probabilistic behavior, but does not provide quantitative evaluation of achieved system safety. An approach to selection of safety mechanisms has been proposed in [22]. It is similar to our approach in that a "library of diagnostic techniques" is used to deliver safety mechanisms for IEC 61508 compliance.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Early safety evaluation of design decisions in E/E architecture according to ISO 26262

Rupanov¹,

Buckl

Fiege

et al. 2012

Proceedings of the 3rd International ACM SIGSOFT Symposium on Architecting Critical Systems

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ISO 26262 addresses development of safe in-vehicle functions by specifying methods potentially used in the design and development lifecycle. It does not indicate what is sufficient and leaves room for interpretation. However, the architects of electric/electronic systems need design boundaries to make decisions during architecture evolution without adding a risk of late architectural changes. Designing and changing a system benefits from correct selection of safety mechanisms at early design stages. This paper presents an iterative architecture design and refinement process that is centered around ISO 26262 requirements. We propose a domain-specific modeling scheme and component repositories to build up a bottom-up analysis framework that allows early quantitative safety evaluation. To guarantee that the target ASIL level can be reached, we complement our designtime component-level analysis with conservative top-down analysis. Given that analysis starts at early design stages, evolution of the architecture is supported by different levels of detail used in the analysis framework.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Early safety evaluation of design decisions in E/E architecture according to ISO 26262

Rupanov¹,

Buckl

Fiege

et al. 2012

Proceedings of the 3rd International ACM SIGSOFT Symposium on Architecting Critical Systems

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“…However, even the safe torque off application is safety-critical and therefore we used our approach to generate appropriate fault detection mechanisms to assure its safety. As has been shown in [38], our approach is able to generate a lot of the fault detection mechanisms, mentioned in IEC 61508.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 86%

Deriving fault-detection mechanisms from safety requirements

2011

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Safety requirements are an important artifact in the development of safety critical systems. They are used by experts as a basis for appropriate selection and implementation of fault detection mechanisms. Various research groups have worked on their formal modeling with the goal of determining if a system can meet these requirements.In this paper, we propose the application of formal models of safety requirements throughout all constructive development phases of a model-driven development process to automatically generate appropriate fault detection mechanisms. The main contribution of this paper is a rigorous formal specification of safety requirements that allows the automatic propagation, transformation and refinement of safety requirements and the derivation of appropriate fault detection mechanisms. This is an important step to guarantee consistency and completeness in the critical transition from requirements engineering to software design, where a lot of errors can be introduced into a system by using conventional, non-formal techniques.

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“…[19]). The models have addressed specific aspects of the standards, such as their processes [20][21][22], artefact traceability [23,24], system specification [17,18,25], system architecture [26,27], quality-related aspects [28], faults [29], and testing [30]. The models in [8,25] address both process and system specification.…”

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confidence: 99%

Model-based specification of safety compliance needs for critical systems: A holistic generic metamodel

Ruíz

Attwood

Espinoza

et al. 2016

Information and Software Technology

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eprints@whiterose.ac.uk https://eprints.whiterose.ac.uk/ Reuse Unless indicated otherwise, fulltext items are protected by copyright with all rights reserved. The copyright exception in section 29 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 allows the making of a single copy solely for the purpose of non-commercial research or private study within the limits of fair dealing. The publisher or other rights-holder may allow further reproduction and re-use of this version -refer to the White Rose Research Online record for this item. Where records identify the publisher as the copyright holder, users can verify any specific terms of use on the publisher's website. TakedownIf you consider content in White Rose Research Online to be in breach of UK law, please notify us by emailing eprints@whiterose.ac.uk including the URL of the record and the reason for the withdrawal request. Model-Based Specification of Safety Compliance Needs for CriticalSystems: A Holistic Generic Metamodel! Abstract!Context: Many critical systems must comply with safety standards as a way of providing assurance that they do not pose undue risks to people, property, or the environment. Safety compliance is a very demanding activity, as the standards can consist of hundreds of pages and practitioners typically have to show the fulfilment of thousands of safety-related criteria. Furthermore, the text of the standards can be ambiguous, inconsistent, and hard to understand, making it difficult to determine how to effectively structure and manage safety compliance information. These issues become even more challenging when a system is intended to be reused in another application domain with different applicable standards.Objective: This paper aims to resolve these issues by providing a metamodel for the specification of safety compliance needs for critical systems. Method: The metamodel is holistic and generic, and abstracts common concepts for demonstrating safety compliance from different standards and application domains. Its application results in the specification of Òreference assurance frameworksÓ for safety-critical systems, which correspond to a model of the safety criteria of a given standard. For validating the metamodel with safety standards, parts of several standards have been modelled by both academic and industry personnel, and other standards have been analysed. We further augment this with feedback from practitioners, including feedback during a workshop. Results:The results from the validation show that the metamodel can be used to specify safety compliance needs for aerospace, automotive, avionics, defence, healthcare, machinery, maritime, oil and gas, process industry, railway, and robotics. Practitioners consider that the metamodel can meet their needs and find benefits in its use. Conclusion:The metamodel supports the specification of safety compliance needs for most critical computer-based and software-intensive systems. The resulting models can provide an effective means of structuring and managing safety compliance infor...

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Synthesis of diagnostic techniques based on an IEC 61508-aware metamodel

Cited by 5 publications

References 3 publications

Early safety evaluation of design decisions in E/E architecture according to ISO 26262

Early safety evaluation of design decisions in E/E architecture according to ISO 26262

Deriving fault-detection mechanisms from safety requirements

Model-based specification of safety compliance needs for critical systems: A holistic generic metamodel

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