Speakers tend to reproduce syntactic structures that they have recently comprehended or produced. This structural or syntactic priming occurs despite differences in the particular conceptual or event roles expressed in prime and target sentences (Bock & Loebell, 1990). In two sentence recall studies, we used the tendency of speakers to paraphrase the finite complements of object-raising verbs as infinitive complements (e.g., "John believed that Mary was nice" as "John believed Mary to be nice") to test whether an additional conceptual role would affect priming. Prime constructions with identical constituent orders as object-raising infinitives but an additional conceptual role ("John persuaded Mary to be nice") resulted in fewer paraphrases. Contrasts with other constructions suggest that the critical difference between primes was this extra conceptual role. Thus, subtle differences in conceptual structures can affect how speakers grammatically encode message elements.The meaning of an utterance constrains the form of its expression. For instance, a speaker who wishes to talk about one thing affecting another thing is more likely to create a sentence with two noun phrases than a sentence with only one noun phrase. Given information about what a speaker intends to express and context of the utterance, there is a limited set of constructions that the speaker can felicitously use. Yet, despite the many systematic meaning-form correlations present in languages, the mappings between them are not always one-to-one (for discussion, see e.g., Givón, 1995; Goldberg, 1995; Lambrecht, 1994;Smith, 2000). Many messages can be expressed by more than one sentence structure. One of the puzzles of sentence production is how utterances end up with the structures they do.In the present study, we used the phenomenon of structural priming to explore the relationships between meaning and form as they relate to constructing sentences. In the