Symmetric hash functions for secure fingerprint biometric systems

Tulyakov, Sergey; Farooq, Faisal; Mansukhani, Praveer; Govindaraju, Venu

doi:10.1016/j.patrec.2007.08.008

Cited by 102 publications

(30 citation statements)

References 18 publications

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“…Thus, the biometric matching takes place directly in the transformed domain. Biohashing [7], cancelable biometrics [8], and robust hashing [9] are some of the well-known schemes that can be grouped under feature transformation. Some feature transformation schemes [7] are non-invertible only when the supplementary data (e.g., key or password) is assumed to be a secret.…”

Section: Biometric Template Protection Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biometric Template Protection: Bridging the performance gap between theory and practice

Nandakumar

Jain²

2015

IEEE Signal Process. Mag.

266

147

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Abstract-Biometric recognition is an integral component of modern identity management and access control systems. Due to the strong and permanent link between individuals and their biometric traits, exposure of enrolled users' biometric information to adversaries can seriously compromise biometric system security and user privacy. Numerous techniques have been proposed for biometric template protection over the last 20 years. While these techniques are theoretically sound, they seldom guarantee the desired non-invertibility, revocability, and non-linkability properties without significantly degrading the recognition performance. The objective of this work is to analyze the factors contributing to this performance gap and highlight promising research directions to bridge this gap. Design of invariant biometric representations remains a fundamental problem, despite recent attempts to address this issue through feature adaptation schemes. The difficulty in estimating the statistical distribution of biometric features not only hinders the development of better template protection algorithms, but also diminishes the ability to quantify the non-invertibility and non-linkability of existing algorithms. Finally, achieving nonlinkability without the use of external secrets (e.g., passwords) continues to be a challenging proposition. Further research on the above issues is required to cross the chasm between theory and practice in biometric template protection.

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Section: Biometric Template Protection Approachesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biometric Template Protection: Bridging the performance gap between theory and practice

Nandakumar

Jain²

2015

IEEE Signal Process. Mag.

266

147

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…PCA and ICA (independent component analysis) coefficients are extracted and both feature vectors are randomly scrambled and added in order to create a transformed template. Tulyakov et al [162,163] propose a method for generating cancelable fingerprint hashes. Instead of aligning fingerprint minutiae, the authors apply order invariant hash functions, i.e., symmetric complex hash functions.…”

Section: Further Investigations On Cancelable Biometricsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Lee et al [167] presented a method for generating alignment-free cancelable fingerprint templates. Similar to [59,162,163], orientation information is used for each minutiae point. Cancelability is provided by a user's PIN and the user-specific random vector is used to extract translation and rotation invariant values of minutiae points.…”

Section: Further Investigations On Cancelable Biometricsmentioning

confidence: 99%

A survey on biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics

Rathgeb

Uhl

2011

EURASIP J. on Info. Security

496

337

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Form a privacy perspective most concerns against the common use of biometrics arise from the storage and misuse of biometric data. Biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics represent emerging technologies of biometric template protection addressing these concerns and improving public confidence and acceptance of biometrics. In addition, biometric cryptosystems provide mechanisms for biometric-dependent key-release. In the last years a significant amount of approaches to both technologies have been published. A comprehensive survey of biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics is presented. State-of-the-art approaches are reviewed based on which an in-depth discussion and an outlook to future prospects are given.

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“…In this scheme, each minutiae is transformed according to the orientation field around that minutiae, which makes the relative translation of the minutiae invariant to the positioning of the finger. Tulyakov et al 22 use each minutia along with its two nearest neighbors to select one of the several symmetric functions available. The selected symmetric function is then evaluated on the three minutiae to obtain the coordinates of the transformed minutia.…”

Section: Interest Point Based Template Transformationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biometric template transformation: a security analysis

2010

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One of the critical steps in designing a secure biometric system is protecting the templates of the users that are stored either in a central database or on smart cards. If a biometric template is compromised, it leads to serious security and privacy threats because unlike passwords, it is not possible for a legitimate user to revoke his biometric identifiers and switch to another set of uncompromised identifiers. One methodology for biometric template protection is the template transformation approach, where the template, consisting of the features extracted from the biometric trait, is transformed using parameters derived from a user specific password or key. Only the transformed template is stored and matching is performed directly in the transformed domain. In this paper, we formally investigate the security strength of template transformation techniques and define six metrics that facilitate a holistic security evaluation. Furthermore, we analyze the security of two wellknown template transformation techniques, namely, Biohashing and cancelable fingerprint templates based on the proposed metrics. Our analysis indicates that both these schemes are vulnerable to intrusion and linkage attacks because it is relatively easy to obtain either a close approximation of the original template (Biohashing) or a pre-image of the transformed template (cancelable fingerprints). We argue that the security strength of template transformation techniques must also consider the computational complexity of obtaining a complete pre-image of the transformed template in addition to the complexity of recovering the original biometric template.

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Symmetric hash functions for secure fingerprint biometric systems

Cited by 102 publications

References 18 publications

Biometric Template Protection: Bridging the performance gap between theory and practice

Biometric Template Protection: Bridging the performance gap between theory and practice

A survey on biometric cryptosystems and cancelable biometrics

Biometric template transformation: a security analysis

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