Symbolic Verification of Distance Bounding Protocols

Debant, Alexandre; Delaune, Stéphanie

doi:10.1007/978-3-030-17138-4_7

Cited by 13 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…There exist various symbolic models that showcase the EMV contactless protocols [16], [17], [24]- [26]. All of these focus on verifying proximity between the card and the terminal.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

The EMV Standard: Break, Fix, Verify

Basin

Sasse

Toro-Pozo

2021

2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

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EMV is the international protocol standard for smartcard payment and is used in over 9 billion cards worldwide. Despite the standard's advertised security, various issues have been previously uncovered, deriving from logical flaws that are hard to spot in EMV's lengthy and complex specification, running over 2,000 pages.We formalize a comprehensive symbolic model of EMV in Tamarin, a state-of-the-art protocol verifier. Our model is the first that supports a fine-grained analysis of all relevant security guarantees that EMV is intended to offer. We use our model to automatically identify flaws that lead to two critical attacks: one that defrauds the cardholder and another that defrauds the merchant. First, criminals can use a victim's Visa contactless card for high-value purchases, without knowledge of the card's PIN. We built a proof-of-concept Android application and successfully demonstrated this attack on real-world payment terminals. Second, criminals can trick the terminal into accepting an unauthentic offline transaction, which the issuing bank should later decline, after the criminal has walked away with the goods. This attack is possible for implementations following the standard, although we did not test it on actual terminals for ethical reasons. Finally, we propose and verify improvements to the standard that prevent these attacks, as well as any other attacks that violate the considered security properties. The proposed improvements can be easily implemented in the terminals and do not affect the cards in circulation.

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“…There exist various symbolic models that showcase the EMV contactless protocols [16], [17], [24]- [26]. All of these focus on verifying proximity between the card and the terminal.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

The EMV Standard: Break, Fix, Verify

Basin

Sasse

Toro-Pozo

2021

2021 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP)

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“…Assumptions are made and a comparison is made on the relative strength of various DB protocols. A new symbolic model is proposed by Debant, Delaune & Wiedling (2020) in the domain of NFC. The concept of automated verification is given by the use of ProVerif tool.…”

Section: Distance Bounding Protocols In Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

A new secure authentication based distance bounding protocol

Sultan

Rashid

Khan

et al. 2021

PeerJ Computer Science

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Numerous systems are being employed in daily life where two entities authenticate each other over a range of distance. The distance involved is relatively small, but still attacks were documented. The distance bounding (DB) protocol was introduced to cater to security requirements. The schemes, however, are still prone to several threats; mainly the Relay Attack (Terrorist and Mafia Fraud). In Mafia Fraud, an attempts are made to get accepted as the prover either by replaying of messages or by the help a malicious key. In Terrorist fraud, an attempt is made to extract the secret from the verifying entity, either by extracting the key from the message captured or by physically tempering the verifying/proving entity. Therefore the mitigation of these attacks needs to be done; as to not put computational overhead on the scheme. The paper presents a comprehensive and comparative performance analysis of twelve DB protocols based on defined metrics. It also proposes a protocol which incorporates the design elements needed for added security, is computationally easy to implement and resistant to most of the threats mentioned. Analysis of the protocol is carried out against the security requirements.

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“…To overcome this limitation, getting some inspiration from earlier works (e.g. [25,4,28]), some recent works have proposed to incorporate new features in existing symbolic models [23,14,11,13], making the analysis of distance bounding protocols possible relying on existing verification tools (e.g. ProVerif, Tamarin).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Due to this, such a security property can not be analysed using techniques deployed in e.g. [23,14,13]. Our main contribution is to provide reduction results to reduce the number of topologies we have to consider during our analysis, and more importantly to reduce the possible behaviours of our terrorist prover.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Symbolic Analysis of Terrorist Fraud Resistance

Debant¹,

Delaune²,

Wiedling³

2019

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Distance-bounding protocols aim at preventing several kinds of attacks, amongst which terrorist fraud, where a far away malicious prover colludes with an attacker to authenticate once, without giving him any advantage for future authentication. In this paper, we consider a symbolic setting and propose a formal definition of terrorist fraud, as well as two reduction results. When looking for an attack, we can first restrict ourselves to consider a particular (and quite simple) topology. Moreover, under some mild hypotheses, the far away malicious prover has a best strategy on which we can focus on when looking for an attack. These two reduction results make possible the analysis of terrorist fraud resistance using an existing verification tool. As an application, we analyse several distance-bounding protocols, as well as some contactless payment protocols using the ProVerif tool.

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Symbolic Verification of Distance Bounding Protocols

Cited by 13 publications

References 29 publications

The EMV Standard: Break, Fix, Verify

The EMV Standard: Break, Fix, Verify

A new secure authentication based distance bounding protocol

Symbolic Analysis of Terrorist Fraud Resistance

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