Symbolic state-building in contemporary Russia

Wengle, Susanne A.; Evans, Christine

doi:10.1080/1060586x.2018.1507409

Cited by 4 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…Then, in the 2000s, the presidency consolidated its standing. It came to dominate politics and decision making (Huskey 2009, 216; Sakwa 2010, 188; Gel’man and Starodubtsev 2016; Huskey 2016, 72; Wengle and Evans 2018, 385) and repressive laws and actions against political opposition and nongovernmental organizations involved in human rights promotion were introduced (J. W. Hahn 2004; G. M. Hahn 2004; Gill 2006; McFaul and Stoner-Weiss 2008; Petrone 2011; Smyth 2016; Flikke 2016). “The only institution that claims the mantle of ideological authority is President Putin, whose words are interpreted as the state-supported ideological tenets” (Lipman 2015, 121): vestiges of the “correct line” (Huskey 2014, 121).…”

Section: Russian Governance and The Political Regimementioning

confidence: 99%

Producing Kartinka: Street-Level Bureaucracy and Implementation of Russia’s Tolerance Policy in St. Petersburg

Sarkisyan

2022

Nationalities Papers

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In 2006, a “tolerance policy” was launched in St. Petersburg to address the growing xenophobia and the need to integrate labor migrants. Applying a bottom–up perspective, this study finds that this policy was symbolic – aimed at changing public attitudes, not at providing material outcomes. The direct implementers (the street-level bureaucracy), operating under governmental constraints, drew on informal mechanisms: behind-the-scenes negotiations, unwritten rules and hierarchies, personalist power, and ideological cues. Formalized dense reporting, often quantitative, was used to keep low-level implementers in check. The combination of these features rendered the tolerance policy shallow and self-locked. Street-level bureaucracy had to interpret vague policy documents, but lacked the necessary discretionary powers. This gave rise to the kartinka (picture, or image) coping technique. The term describes how all work activities were shaped by the need to demonstrate progress with respect to unwritten rules and ideological dynamics. The article concludes with a discussion of the applicability of the author’s findings to the field of nationalities policy in Russia.

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Section: Russian Governance and The Political Regimementioning

confidence: 99%

Producing Kartinka: Street-Level Bureaucracy and Implementation of Russia’s Tolerance Policy in St. Petersburg

Sarkisyan

2022

Nationalities Papers

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“…Participatory technologies can serve similar purposes for non-democracies: Instead of bolstering approval of democratic governance, participatory technologies can improve views of the existing, non-democratic order (Hill & Gaddy, 2013; Pisano, 2014; Wengle & Evans, 2018). They can, in short, shore up autocracies.…”

Section: Theory and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I hypothesize that simply being aware of the Direct Line will increase support for Putin. The Direct Line primes the public to view the broadcast as a genuine means of voice with Putin as the primary interlocutor (Ryazanova-Clarke, 2008; Wengle & Evans, 2018). Indeed, when asked about the purpose of the Direct Line, a plurality of individuals (44%) stated that the reason was “for the government to learn about the concerns of society” (Levada Analytical Center, 2016).…”

Section: Awareness and Autocratic Approvalmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…These include formal institutions such as legislatures, political parties, and elections (Blaydes, 2010; Boix & Svolik, 2007; Gandhi, 2009; Gandhi & Przeworski, 2006, 2007; He & Warren, 2011; Lust-Okar, 2006; Magaloni, 2006; Malesky & Schuler, 2010; Nathan, 2003). More recently, scholars have posited that non-electoral forms of participation, including elite-mass communication strategies that specifically promote two-way communication between ordinary citizens and their leaders—what I call participatory technologies —can serve similar purposes (e.g., Hill & Gaddy, 2013; Pisano, 2014; Wengle & Evans, 2018). However, we have relatively little knowledge about the extent to which these opportunities actually impact public opinion and the mechanisms by which they do so (for an exception, see Truex, 2017).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 6. Wengle and Evans (2018) argue that the Direct Line projects an image of the state as “accountable, interested, and responsive to citizens’ concerns” (p. 391). …”

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confidence: 99%

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Shoring Up Autocracy: Participatory Technologies and Regime Support in Putin’s Russia

Chapman

2021

Comparative Political Studies

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How do autocrats build support? This study argues that autocrats create and maintain participatory technologies—elite-mass communication strategies that promote two-way interaction between citizens and leaders—to foster support. Participatory technologies provide citizens with the opportunity to have a limited voice in otherwise closed political systems. I test this theory through a series of two nationally-representative survey experiments in Russia. Results suggest that awareness of participatory technologies increases approval of President Putin and improves perceptions that there are opportunities for voice in politics. This finding departs from previous research that suggests public opinion is influenced primarily by participation. Furthermore, I demonstrate that these effects can be directly attributed to the communicative format of these strategies, not to issue resolution or leadership effects. Finally, I demonstrate that effects are dependent upon individuals’ political sophistication and political priors, contributing to political polarization and opening up the potential for backlash against the regime.

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The Russian Media

Gehlbach¹,

Lokot²,

Shirikov³

2022

Russian Politics Today

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For seven decades, the Soviet government and the ruling Communist Party of the Soviet Union prioritized reshaping society and creating a "new Soviet man" who would be, among other things, loyal to the party and infused with Marxist-Leninist ideology (Hoffmann 2011). In pursuit of this aim, all news and information made available to citizens was carefully filtered. The party and government ministries controlled all media in the country, from central television to local newspapers. A Soviet joke ran: "In Russia, we have two channels on TV. Channel One is propaganda. Channel Two is a KGB officer who tells you to turn back to Channel One" (Popson 1985). By the 1980s, the number of Soviet television channels had increased to six, but the political views they promoted were coordinated by the Propaganda Department of the Communist Party. This centralized control made it impossible for critical or ideologically inconsistent news stories to reach a wide audience. Information from abroad was typically blocked: Foreign radio stations, such as Radio Liberty, were often jammed (Nelson 1997), and only selected Western books and movies were allowed (Roth-Ey 2012).In the late 1980s, many Russians tasted media freedom for the first time, as Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev's reforms began to chip away at central party control. Gorbachev declared a policy of glasnost (openness), which held that Soviet citizens could criticize the government's shortcomings and debate its policies. This led to a relaxation of censorship and the beginning of real political discussion in the national media, as well as the emergence of tabloid-style journalism (McNair 1991). Popular media outlets such as Moskovskie Novosti, Ogonek, and Literaturnaia Gazeta published critical pieces on Stalin's repressions, the state of the Soviet economy, and other contentious issues.The overwhelming majority of Russian media organizations were at this stage still owned and controlled by the state, and certain politically sensitive topics were still censored. Nonetheless, by 1990, Western media were allowed to circulate more freely, and vibrant commercial newspapers such as Kommersant and Nezavisimaia Gazeta and radio stations such as Ekho Moskvy were established. The Soviet state also began to relax control over television, once the pillar of the communist propaganda machine.These changes played a key role in the anti-Gorbachev putsch of 1991, which foundered in part on the failure of the plottersa group of Communist hardlinersto establish monopoly control of the airwaves. Even as the State Committee on the State of Emergency ordered state media to broadcast pro-putsch messagesan order that was only partially fulfilled, as central state television gave voice to the oppositionprotest rallies and other events on the ground were covered by Ekho Moskvy and Voice of America. The failure of the putsch deprived the Communist Party of its

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Symbolic state-building in contemporary Russia

Cited by 4 publications

References 39 publications

Producing Kartinka: Street-Level Bureaucracy and Implementation of Russia’s Tolerance Policy in St. Petersburg

Producing Kartinka: Street-Level Bureaucracy and Implementation of Russia’s Tolerance Policy in St. Petersburg

Shoring Up Autocracy: Participatory Technologies and Regime Support in Putin’s Russia

The Russian Media

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