Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property

Grossman, Herschel I.; Kim, Minseong

doi:10.1086/601453

Cited by 513 publications

(326 citation statements)

References 8 publications

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“…For instance, theoretical results suggest that conflicts can be avoided through communication (Crawford and Sobel, 1982;Kreps and Wilson, 1982;Milgrom and Roberts, 1982), contracting and side-payments (Hirshleifer, 1995;Muthoo, 2004;Beviá and Corchón, 2010), centralization Grossman (2002), extensive armament (Schelling, 1960;Garfinkel, 1990;Grossman and Kim, 1995;Smith et al, 2014), and also through political systems that emphasize open, rule-governed competition (North et al, 2009). …”

Section: Conflict Avoidancementioning

confidence: 99%

War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends

Kimbrough

Laughren

Sheremeta

2020

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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We review the main economic models of war and conflict. These models vary in details, but their implications are qualitatively consistent, highlighting key commonalities across a variety of conflict settings. Recent empirical literature, employing both laboratory and field data, in many cases confirms the basic implications of conflict theory. However, this literature also presents important challenges to the way economists traditionally model conflict. We finish our review by suggesting ways to address these challenges.JEL classifications: D72, D74, F51, F52, F54, H56, N4, Q34

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Section: Conflict Avoidancementioning

confidence: 99%

War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends

Kimbrough

Laughren

Sheremeta

2020

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…The notion that appropriation and violent conflict over the ownership for resources should be modeled as an alternative to economic production was originally articulated by Haavelmo (1954) and further developed by follow-up papers such as Hirshleifer (1991), Grossman (1994), Grossman andKim (1995), Grossman andIyigun (1995, 1997), Skaperdas (1992Skaperdas ( , 2005, Alesina and Spolaore (2007) and Hafer (2006). The work below sits at the junction of these two strands since it examines the role of religion in influencing conflict and war.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Lessons from the Ottoman Harem on Culture, Religion, and Wars

İyigün

2013

Economic Development and Cultural Change

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The Ottoman Empire had a profound impact in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa at the apogee of its power, covering the era between 1453 CE and 1699 CE. In this paper, I exploit the empire's unique culture and institutions to examine the roles of ethnicity and religion in conflict and war. Using comprehensive data on Ottoman wars and conflicts covering the reigns of 31 Ottoman sultans between 1400 CE and 1909 CE, I document that the ethnic background of Valide Sultan (the queen mother) was an important and independent determinant of whether the empire engaged in military conquests in Europe, North Africa or the Middle East. Depending on the empirical specification, the reign of a sultan with a European maternal genealogy was enough to offset more than 70 percent of the empire's western orientation in imperial conquests. While these findings do not rule out a direct role of queen mothers and Harem politics in Ottoman affairs, they are more in line with a longer-term channel of cultural transmission between the Valide Sultans and their sons.

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“…13 The late Herschel Grossman adopted a focus on property rights and distinguished between common-pool and initialclaims models. As an example, Grossman and Kim (1995) showed that, with defensive investment before appropriation, a sufficiently large defensive advantage causes initial possession to remain unchallenged. In Hausken (2004) I distinguished between the offense and defense to enable exchange to emerge, and Anderton et al (1999) distinguished between one attacker and one defender in an exchange model.…”

Section: Equilibrium Strategies Do Indeed Depend On Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Jack Hirshleifer: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed

Hausken

2006

European Journal of Political Economy

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Jack Hirshleifer contributed to investment theory, information economics, conflict, and bioeconomics, clarified the foundations of investment and capital theory in the spirit of Fisher, and made basic contributions to the analysis of covariance risk, gambling and insurance, the Modigliani-Miller Theorem, and public investment through a focus on time, uncertainty and information. He formulated new models of public goods, added to understanding of contest success functions, and explained the paradox of power. He developed a general equilibrium approach to conflict jointly encompassing production, exchange, appropriation and defense. He analyzed the emotions as guarantors of threats and promises, proposed alternatives to the tit-for-tat strategy, considered the bioeconomic causes of war, and investigated the truthful signaling hypothesis. Jack Hirshleifer was a leading scholar and original thinker of the 20th century. His scientific contributions have left a Nobel Prize unbestowed.Keywords: Investment and capital theory; Information economics; Applied theories of the firm; Uncertainty and information; Price theory; Economics; Political economy; The economic theory of conflict; Public goods; Production; Appropriation; Fighting; Combat; War; Bioeconomics; Biology; Evolutionary economics; Evolutionary psychology; Water supply and resource economics Beginning in 1950, Jack placed the theory of investment, interest, and capital on a firm theoretical foundation. He was also a founding father of the information economics revolution. In particular, he felt that investment theory was a confused mass of ill-defined concepts that were in dire need of a clear integrative framework. He found the basis for that framework in the work of Irving Fisher, and was thereby able to dispel controversies and distinguish lucidly between past ideas that were sensible and those that were confusions.From the late 1970s and thereafter, he was a leading economist contributing to our understanding of phenomena that had been usually studied within disciplines such as political science and biology. Jack was an economic theorist with broad-ranging interests. His fields of specialization included investment and capital theory, information economics, applied theories of the firm, uncertainty and information, price theory economics, political economy, the economic theory of conflict, public goods, production, appropriation, combat, war, bioeconomics, biology, evolutionary economics, evolutionary psychology, water supply and resource economics. During the period 1950-2005 he authored 7 books, some 75 articles, and 7 book reviews.Section 2 sets out Jack Hirshleifer's background and career. Section 3 discusses investment theory and the information economics revolution. Section 4 proceeds with the expanding domain of economics, conflict and sociobiology. Section 5 considers the provision of public goods. Section 6 is on conflict and Section 7 on biology. Section 8 provides a concluding evaluation of Jack Hirshleifer's scientific contributions.

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Swords or Plowshares? A Theory of the Security of Claims to Property

Cited by 513 publications

References 8 publications

War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends

War and conflict in economics: Theories, applications, and recent trends

Lessons from the Ottoman Harem on Culture, Religion, and Wars

Jack Hirshleifer: A Nobel Prize left unbestowed

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