Swine Influenza Virus Antibodies in Humans, Western Europe, 2009

Gerloff, Nancy; Kremer, Jacques R.; Charpentier, Émilie; Sausy, Aurélie; Olinger, Christophe M.; Weicherding, Pierre; Schuh, John; Reeth, Kristien Van

doi:10.3201/eid1703100581

Cited by 7 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 27 publications

(15 reference statements)

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Olsen et al, 2003;Yassine et al, 2007;Gagnon et al, 2009;Tremblay et al, 2011). Few case-control studies, conducted either in Europe or in the USA, have been carried out to elucidate risk factors associated with SIV transmission to humans and occupational exposure has repeatedly been identified as a risk factor (Olsen et al, 2002;Myers et al, 2006;Gerloff et al, 2009). So far, H3N2pM viruses have been isolated only from humans and the virological mechanisms behind this event or potential human-to-human transmission in the future are currently unknown.…”

Section: Inter-species Transmissionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scientific opinion on the possible risks posed by the influenza A (H3N2v) virus for animal health and its potential spread and implications for animal and human health

Authié¹,

Berg²,

Bøtner³

et al. 2013

EFS2

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Swine are an important host in influenza virus ecology since they are susceptible to infections with both avian and human influenza A viruses. In 2011 and 2012, clusters of human infection with a swine‐origin influenza A(H3N2) variant virus (H3N2v) containing the matrix (M) gene from the 2009 H1N1 pandemic virus were reported in the United States (US). The likelihood of introduction of H3N2v virus into the EU, and subsequent exposure and infection of EU pig herds was assessed. The overall likelihood of a pig holding in the EU being infected by exposure to H3N2v virus through either imported infectious pigs or humans coming from the US was estimated to be low. Efficient separation of imported pigs for 30 days would reduce the likelihood of exposure to a negligible level. The likelihood that H3N2v would spread to other pig holdings was judged to be high, assuming frequent movements of pigs between holdings. Currently, applied real time RT‐PCRs can detect all swine influenza A viruses and, combined with gene sequencing, would identify the emergence of H3N2v virus. However, sequencing is not done on a routine basis in EU. Experimental studies in pigs show that the infection is purely of respiratory nature and follows a relatively mild course with fever, coughing and inappetence, similar to that of the endemic swine influenza viruses. Immunity resulting from vaccination with European vaccines may provide some cross‐protection against infection with H3N2v virus whereas vaccines based on US swine H3N2 strains would offer superior protection. It is not possible to predict which changes within H3N2v virus might enable it to develop pandemic properties. Hence, it is not possible at present to set up a specific system to monitor such a risk. Nevertheless, it is recommended to reinforce the monitoring of influenza strains circulating in pigs in EU.

show abstract

Section: Inter-species Transmissionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Scientific opinion on the possible risks posed by the influenza A (H3N2v) virus for animal health and its potential spread and implications for animal and human health

Authié¹,

Berg²,

Bøtner³

et al. 2013

EFS2

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Epidemiological Risk Factors for Animal Influenza A Viruses Overcoming Species Barriers

et al. 2017

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Drivers and risk factors for Influenza A virus transmission across species barriers are poorly understood, despite the ever present threat to human and animal health potentially on a pandemic scale. Here we review the published evidence for epidemiological risk factors associated with influenza viruses transmitting between animal species and from animals to humans. A total of 39 papers were found with evidence of epidemiological risk factors for influenza virus transmission from animals to humans; 18 of which had some statistical measure associated with the transmission of a virus. Circumstantial or observational evidence of risk factors for transmission between animal species was found in 21 papers, including proximity to infected animals, ingestion of infected material and potential association with a species known to carry influenza virus. Only three publications were found which presented a statistical measure of an epidemiological risk factor for the transmission of influenza between animal species. This review has identified a significant gap in knowledge regarding epidemiological risk factors for the transmission of influenza viruses between animal species.

show abstract

Transmission and pathogenicity of novel reassortants derived from Eurasian avian-like and 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza viruses in mice and guinea pigs

Kong

Liu

Sun

et al. 2016

Sci Rep

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Given the present extensive co-circulation in pigs of Eurasian avian-like (EA) swine H1N1 and 2009 pandemic (pdm/09) H1N1 viruses, reassortment between them is highly plausible but largely uncharacterized. Here, experimentally co-infected pigs with a representative EA virus and a pdm/09 virus yielded 55 novel reassortant viruses that could be categorized into 17 genotypes from Gt1 to Gt17 based on segment segregation. Majority of novel reassortants were isolated from the lower respiratory tract. Most of reassortant viruses were more pathogenic and contagious than the parental EA viruses in mice and guinea pigs. The most transmissible reassortant genotypes demonstrated in guinea pigs (Gt2, Gt3, Gt7, Gt10 and Gt13) were also the most lethal in mice. Notably, nearly all these highly virulent reassortants (all except Gt13) were characterized with possession of EA H1 and full complement of pdm/09 ribonucleoprotein genes. Compositionally, we demonstrated that EA H1-222G contributed to virulence by its ability to bind avian-type sialic acid receptors, and that pdm/09 RNP conferred the most robust polymerase activity to reassortants. The present study revealed high reassortment compatibility between EA and pdm/09 viruses in pigs, which could give rise to progeny reassortant viruses with enhanced virulence and transmissibility in mice and guinea pig models.

show abstract

Swine Influenza Virus Antibodies in Humans, Western Europe, 2009

Cited by 7 publications

References 27 publications

Scientific opinion on the possible risks posed by the influenza A (H3N2v) virus for animal health and its potential spread and implications for animal and human health

Scientific opinion on the possible risks posed by the influenza A (H3N2v) virus for animal health and its potential spread and implications for animal and human health

Epidemiological Risk Factors for Animal Influenza A Viruses Overcoming Species Barriers

Transmission and pathogenicity of novel reassortants derived from Eurasian avian-like and 2009 pandemic H1N1 influenza viruses in mice and guinea pigs

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About