Sweet Dreams Are Made of This? A HOT Response to Sebastián

Weisberg, Josh

doi:10.1007/978-94-007-6001-1_30

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 28 publications

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“…For instance, during REM sleep, prefrontal cortex activity is often low compared to awake states, even though the experienced content may be just as vivid (for some discussion see e.g. Sebastián, 2014;Weisberg, 2014). Similarly, patients undergoing generalized seizures have increased blood flow in prefrontal areas, even though they are considered unconscious.…”

Section: Facing Up To the Missing Isomorphismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Finding the neural correlates of consciousness will not solve all our problems

Overgaard¹,

Kirkeby-Hinrup

2021

PhiMiSci

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Subjective experience has often taken center stage in debates between competing conceptual theories of the mind. This is also a central object of concern in the empirical domain, and especially in the search for the neural correlates of consciousness (NCCs). By now, most of the competing conceptual theories of consciousness have become aligned with distinct hypotheses about the NCCs. These hypotheses are usually distinguished by reference to their proposed location of the NCCs. This difference in hypothesized location of the NCCs has tempted participants in these debates to infer that evidence indicating the location of the NCCs in one or the other brain region can be taken as direct evidence for or against a given conceptual theory of consciousness. We argue that this is an overestimation of the work finding the NCCs can do for us, and that there are principled reasons to resist this kind of inference. To show this we point out the lack of both an isomorphism and a homomorphism between the conceptual frameworks in which most theories are cached, and the kind of data we can get from neuroimaging. The upshot is that neural activation profiles are insufficient to distinguish between competing theories in the conceptual domain. We suggest two ways to go about ameliorating this issue.

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Section: Facing Up To the Missing Isomorphismmentioning

confidence: 99%

Finding the neural correlates of consciousness will not solve all our problems

Overgaard¹,

Kirkeby-Hinrup

2021

PhiMiSci

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“…As a matter of fact, there are alternative possibilities that he failed to seriously consider. For instance, one could reasonably argue that deactivation while sleeping is not absolute but rather relative to waking activity (Weisberg, 2014, p. 437). If so, cognitive function would be severely impaired rather than shut off—which, indeed, seems to be the case 16 .…”

Section: Dreaming and The Cognitive Versus Noncognitive Debate On Con...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…If so, cognitive function would be severely impaired rather than shut off—which, indeed, seems to be the case 16 . Additionally, “given the known plasticity of the brain and its massively complex interconnected circuitry” (Weisberg, 2014, p. 438), one certainly shouldn’t exclude that cognitive access would be realized by another mechanism in the brain. And, if that were the case, one could expect this cognition to be, at least, a bit different from the waking one.…”

Section: Dreaming and The Cognitive Versus Noncognitive Debate On Con...mentioning

confidence: 99%

“Are dreams experiences?”: Insights from dreaming considered as a conscious experience under constraint of delayed report.

Crespin

2015

Dreaming

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Owing to the fact that frontal regions of the brain are severely deactivated during sleep, there is a seeming inconsistency between the prominent Global Neuronal Workspace Theory of consciousness and the received view that dreams are vivid experiences occurring while sleeping. Indeed, based on the canonical criterion of reportability, Global Neuronal Workspace theorists claim that frontal activation of the brain is a necessary condition for conscious experience. Does it mean the received view is scientifically questionable? We argue the opposite way considering dreaming as a conscious experience that strikingly satisfies the current use of the canonical criterion though occurring under constraint of delayed reports. Further, this compelling condition of delayed report depends on a constitutional dissociation between experiencing and the cognitive mechanisms preparing report that proves very insightful. In line with recent findings from research on waking perception, this dissociation hints that Global Neuronal Workspace Theory is biased. Eventually, we discuss a recent claim according to which dreaming could "settle the debate opposing cognitive and noncognitive theories of consciousness."

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I Cannot Tell You (Everything) About My Dreams: Reply to Ivanowich and Weisberg

Sebastián¹

2013

Consciousness Inside and Out: Phenomenology, Neuroscience, and the Nature of Experience

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One of the main problems for the scientific study of consciousness is methodological. At least prima facie, the kind of knowledge we have of our own experiences is direct and not mediated by an inference process. This kind of knowledge contrasts with the kind of knowledge we have of others' experiences, which relies on the observation of their behavior and their reports.Collecting data for the scientific study of consciousness requires scientists to go beyond their own personal experiences and study others' states. This, in turn, requires that subjects report or act a certain way depending on their experiences. Although we can, at least typically, report on our own experiences, there are two important methodological worries if:1.There are experiences on whose content we cannot report. 2.There are experiences in circumstances in which we cannot report.Theories that I have called Higher-Order Cognitive, like Rosenthal's HOT theory, maintain that the mechanisms that render a state phenomenally conscious depend on the kind of cognitive access that underlies our ability to report the content of the state. These theories deny that −in beings like us, with our reporting abilities unimpaired− 1) is possible.The question at this point is how we can empirically falsify this kind of theory. In order to do so, we would need a case of an experience on which the subject cannot report; but, if this were the case, how can we know that the subject is undergoing an experience? The paper I have presented offers a possible reply to this question.The results of Lau and Passingham's experiment suggest that the neural correlate of the cognitive access that underlies our ability to report lies in the dlPFC, making this area the most plausible candidate to implement the required kind of HOTs. Rosenthal endorses this later idea. Such a commitment is an empirical one and can be empirically falsified. We shouldn't −by no means− think of this as a weakness of the theory; quite the opposite, because the connection between reportability and consciousness is, in any case, a posteriori. Now, if there are circumstances in which a subject undergoes experiences without the corresponding activity in the dlPFC, then the kind of cognitive theories under consideration would be jeopardized. Dreams seem to present such a case.The problem is that dreams are instances of 2) and someone might raise doubts on whether dreams are conscious experiences. In "Not a HOT Dream" I presented the case of lucid dreams in favor of the reality of dreams as conscious experiences, given that subjects are able to make some simple reports during these episodes. Surely, as Weisberg notes and (2010) showed that when rapid eye movements accompanied goal-oriented motor behavior during REM sleep behavior disorder (e.g. grabbing a fictive object, hand greetings, climbing a ladder) the great majority were directed towards the action of the patient (same plane and direction) and they suggest that, when present, rapid eye movements imitate the scanning of the dream scene.I find th...

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Sweet Dreams Are Made of This? A HOT Response to Sebastián

Cited by 5 publications

References 28 publications

Finding the neural correlates of consciousness will not solve all our problems

Finding the neural correlates of consciousness will not solve all our problems

“Are dreams experiences?”: Insights from dreaming considered as a conscious experience under constraint of delayed report.

I Cannot Tell You (Everything) About My Dreams: Reply to Ivanowich and Weisberg

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