“…Moreover, in our model the regulator's objective function differs from the usual Pindyck (2000, 2002) social damage, because it takes into account both the firms' profits, the consumers' surplus, the social damage from pollution and the net governmental revenues from the environmental policies, allowing us to discuss the implications of the above policy interventions (i.e., taxes, emission standards, auctioned permits and freely allocated permits) from the point of view of social welfare. Our paper extends and generalizes previous work on uncertainty affecting the policies to control pollution (i.e., Conrad, 2000; Pindyck, 2000, 2002; Saphores and Carr, 2000; Xepapadeas, 2001; Van Soest, 2005; Nishide and Ohyama, 2009; Agliardi, 2011) by considering an industry in which firms compete à la Cournot, while the above-mentioned papers have been concerned with a purely decision-theoretic framework. Since our analysis compares four policy instruments, it is also more exhaustive than most of them.…”