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We economically motivate and then test a range of hypotheses regarding performance and risk differences between UCITS-compliant and other hedge funds. The latter exhibit more suspicious return patterns than do absolute return UCITS (ARUs), but ARUs exhibit higher levels of operational risk. We find evidence of a strong liquidity premium: hedge funds offer investors less liquidity than do ARUs yet exhibit better risk-adjusted performance. Our findings are substantially unchanged under various robustness tests and adjustments for possible selection bias. The liquidity premium for ARUs and their lack of performance persistence have implications for both investors and policy makers. JEL Classifications: G11, G12, G23Keywords: hedge fund performance, mutual fund performance, managerial skill, regulation 1 IntroductionOne goal of financial regulation is to protect investors by ensuring that markets are fair and that fraudulent activities are minimized. Despite calls in 2009 by the G20 (an international finance minister and central bank governor forum) for coordinated international financial regulation following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, financial regulation continues to vary widely by country. With regard to alternative investment funds, regulatory responses -for example, the US Dodd-Frank Act and the European Union's AIFMD 1 -also display significant geographic differences with regard to liquidity requirements, remuneration rules, and risk limits. Such differences almost certainly have a welfare impact by way of the resulting performance and risk differences among alternative investment funds, which are held by pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and other investors. A particular type of EU investment fund regulation is UCITS, 2 which has global implications because it involves unique and testable restrictions (e.g., the effect of liquidity terms on fund performance) intended to enhance investor protection. We use UCITS restrictions on hedge funds as a natural testing ground for assessing several hypotheses concerning hedge fund performance while carefully adjusting for selection bias.The UCITS funds universe is economically important, and UCITS funds are recognized -and can be marketed -in 75 countries worldwide. The assets under management (AuM) of UCITS funds amount to some $8 trillion, which is comparable to the US mutual fund industry's $11.6 trillion. 3Outside the United States, UCITS funds account for more than half of fund assets worldwide, and about three fourths of the funds publicly sold in Asia are UCITS funds. 4 The impact of UCITS is felt also by non-European investors and managers. For instance, Paulson & Co. (a renowned US hedge fund management firm) launched a UCITS version of its flagship offshore hedge fund with Deutsche Bank in 2010. 5Alternative investment fund managers are increasingly deciding to implement alternative strategies through more regulated vehicles so that they can gain access to the assets of retail and institutional investors, which typically prefer funds that ar...
We economically motivate and then test a range of hypotheses regarding performance and risk differences between UCITS-compliant and other hedge funds. The latter exhibit more suspicious return patterns than do absolute return UCITS (ARUs), but ARUs exhibit higher levels of operational risk. We find evidence of a strong liquidity premium: hedge funds offer investors less liquidity than do ARUs yet exhibit better risk-adjusted performance. Our findings are substantially unchanged under various robustness tests and adjustments for possible selection bias. The liquidity premium for ARUs and their lack of performance persistence have implications for both investors and policy makers. JEL Classifications: G11, G12, G23Keywords: hedge fund performance, mutual fund performance, managerial skill, regulation 1 IntroductionOne goal of financial regulation is to protect investors by ensuring that markets are fair and that fraudulent activities are minimized. Despite calls in 2009 by the G20 (an international finance minister and central bank governor forum) for coordinated international financial regulation following the 2007-2008 financial crisis, financial regulation continues to vary widely by country. With regard to alternative investment funds, regulatory responses -for example, the US Dodd-Frank Act and the European Union's AIFMD 1 -also display significant geographic differences with regard to liquidity requirements, remuneration rules, and risk limits. Such differences almost certainly have a welfare impact by way of the resulting performance and risk differences among alternative investment funds, which are held by pension funds, sovereign wealth funds, and other investors. A particular type of EU investment fund regulation is UCITS, 2 which has global implications because it involves unique and testable restrictions (e.g., the effect of liquidity terms on fund performance) intended to enhance investor protection. We use UCITS restrictions on hedge funds as a natural testing ground for assessing several hypotheses concerning hedge fund performance while carefully adjusting for selection bias.The UCITS funds universe is economically important, and UCITS funds are recognized -and can be marketed -in 75 countries worldwide. The assets under management (AuM) of UCITS funds amount to some $8 trillion, which is comparable to the US mutual fund industry's $11.6 trillion. 3Outside the United States, UCITS funds account for more than half of fund assets worldwide, and about three fourths of the funds publicly sold in Asia are UCITS funds. 4 The impact of UCITS is felt also by non-European investors and managers. For instance, Paulson & Co. (a renowned US hedge fund management firm) launched a UCITS version of its flagship offshore hedge fund with Deutsche Bank in 2010. 5Alternative investment fund managers are increasingly deciding to implement alternative strategies through more regulated vehicles so that they can gain access to the assets of retail and institutional investors, which typically prefer funds that ar...
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In this paper, I survey the recent research in corporate finance on financial securities frauds. I structure my review around the three subjects in this literature: studies of internal and external factors that elicit managerial incentives for fraudulent activities, studies on regulatory and market-based mechanisms that help to deter or detect fraud and on what affects the efficiency of such mechanisms, and studies on the economic and social consequences of financial fraud. I outline the empirical challenges related to this line of research and discuss opportunities for future studies.
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