Surveillance of influenza A virus subtype H5N1 in a live bird market in Yangon, Myanmar: 2017–2018

Thurain, Khin; Mon, Pont Pont; Nasamran, Chanakarn; Charoenkul, Kamonpan; Boonyapisitsopa, Supanat; Tun, Than Naing; San, Yin Yin; Aye, Aung Myo; Amonsin, Alongkorn

doi:10.1111/tbed.13618

Cited by 6 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 35 publications

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“…Testing for antibodies to type A influenza was not conducted because the focus of this work was on H5 avian influenza. However, other surveillance for infections with other avian influenza viruses has been conducted in various locations across Myanmar, especially in live bird markets, and has confirmed the presence of a low pathogenicity H5 virus and infection with H9N2 avian influenza viruses [5,9].…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since then, the Livestock Breeding and Veterinary Department (LBVD) of the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock and Irrigation (MOALI) has reported multiple outbreaks, predominantly in chickens. Viruses within this lineage have also been detected in live poultry markets in samples from the environment and live birds [5]. In addition to the duck serosurveillance, the LBVD conducted targeted, active virus surveillance from 2014 to 2019, with technical support from the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) to detect potentially zoonotic avian influenza virus (AIV) incursion and its in-country spread.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Longitudinal Analysis of Influenza A(H5) Sero-Surveillance in Myanmar Ducks, 2006–2019

Mon

Hadrill²,

Brioudes³

et al. 2021

Microorganisms

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Between 2006 and 2019, serological surveys in unvaccinated domestic ducks reared outdoors in Myanmar were performed, using a haemagglutination inhibition (HI) test, to confirm H5 avian influenza virus circulation and assess temporal and spatial distribution. Positive test results occurred every year that samples were collected. The annual proportion of positive farms ranged from 7.1% to 77.2%. The results revealed silent/sub-clinical influenza A (H5) virus circulation, even in years and States/Regions with no highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) outbreaks reported. Further analysis of the 2018/19 results revealed considerable differences in seroconversion rates between four targeted States/Regions and between years, and showed seroconversion before and during the sampling period. By the end of the trial, a high proportion of farms were seronegative, leaving birds vulnerable to infection when sold. Positive results likely indicate infection with Gs/GD/96-lineage H5Nx HPAI viruses rather than other H5 subtype low-pathogenicity avian influenza viruses. The findings suggested persistent, but intermittent, circulation of Gs/GD/96-lineage H5Nx HPAI viruses in domestic ducks, despite the veterinary services’ outbreak detection and control efforts. The role of wild birds in transmission remains unclear but there is potential for spill-over in both directions. The findings of this study assist the national authorities in the design of appropriate, holistic avian influenza control programs.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Longitudinal Analysis of Influenza A(H5) Sero-Surveillance in Myanmar Ducks, 2006–2019

Mon

Hadrill²,

Brioudes³

et al. 2021

Microorganisms

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“…Figure 16). Information extracted from the scientific literature Thurain et al (2020)described the full genome sequences of four 2.3.2.1c HPAI A(H5N1) viruses detected from swab samples collected in December 2017 from layer chickens, at a live bird market in Myanmar. All segments were closely related to sequences obtained from clade 2.3.2.1c A(H5N1) viruses characterised in China and Vietnam in 2014-2015.…”

Section: The Avian Influenza Situation In Other Countries Not Reportimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Chen et al (2020) studied 21 LPAI A(H9N2) viruses belonging to the same genotype within the G1 lineage: strains had been isolated from chickens and domestic ducks in China between February 2016…”

Section: Detectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Furthermore, India detected several cases of HPAI A(H5N1) in several house crows (Corvus splendens) in previously affected regions and in Bhagawan Birsa Biological Park in Jharkhand Province affecting lesser adjutant (Leptoptilos javanicus), black-headed ibis (Threskiornis melanocephalus) and eastern grass owl (Tyto longimembris) during the relevant time period (Figure16). Geographical distribution, based on available geocoordinates, of confirmed HPAI A(H5N1) outbreaks in domestic birds (circles) and wild birds (triangles) (n=32); grey symbols indicate outbreaks that occurred between 15 May 2019 and 15 February 2020, red symbols indicate outbreaks that occurred between 16 February and 15 May 2020 (FAO, online-b) Information extracted from the scientific literatureThurain et al (2020)described the full genome sequences of four 2.3.2.1c HPAI A(H5N1) viruses detected from swab samples collected in December 2017 from layer chickens, at a live bird market in Myanmar. All segments were closely related to sequences obtained from clade 2.3.2.1c A(H5N1) viruses characterised inChina and Vietnam in 2014-2015.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Avian influenza overview February – May 2020

Adlhoch¹,

Fusaro²,

Kuiken³

et al. 2020

EFS2

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Between 16 February and 15 May 2020, 290highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI) A(H5) virus outbreakswere reported in Europe in poultry (n=287), captive birds (n=2) and wild birds (n=1)in Bulgaria, Czechia,Germany,Hungary andPolandand two low pathogenic avian influenza (LPAI) A(H7N1) virus outbreaks were reported in poultry in Italy. 258 of 287 poultry outbreaks detected in Europe were secondary outbreaks, suggesting that in the large majoryty of cases the spread of the virus was not due to wild birds.Allthe HPAI outbreaks were A(H5N8) apart from three,which were reported as A(H5N2) from Bulgaria. Genetic analysis of the HPAI A(H5N8) viruses isolated from the eastern and central European countries indicates that this is a reassortant between HPAI A(H5N8) viruses from Africa and LPAI viruses from Eurasia. Two distict subtypes were identified in Bulgaria, a novel reassortant A(H5N2) and A(H5N8) that is persisting in the country since 2016. There could be several reasons why only very few HPAI cases were detected in wild birds in this 2019‐2020 epidemic season and a better knowledge of wild bird movements and virus‐host interaction (e.g. susceptibility of the hosts to this virus) could help to understand the reasons for poor detection of HPAI infected wild birds. In comparison with the last reporting period, a decreasing number of HPAI A(H5)‐affected countries and outbreaks were reported from outside Europe. However, there is considerable uncertainty regarding the current epidemiological situation in many countries out of Europe. Four human cases due to A(H9N2) virus infection were reported during the reporting period from China.

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Assessing Behavioral Risk Factors Driving Zoonotic Spillover Among High-risk Populations in Myanmar

et al. 2023

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The increasing global emergence of zoonoses warrants improved awareness of activities that predispose vulnerable communities to greater risk of disease. Zoonotic disease outbreaks regularly occur within Myanmar and at its borders partly due to insufficient knowledge of behavioral risks, hindering participatory surveillance and reporting. This study employed a behavioral surveillance strategy among high-risk populations to understand the behavioral risks for zoonotic disease transmission in an effort to identify risk factors for pathogen spillover. To explore behavioral mechanisms of spillover in Myanmar, we aimed to: (1) evaluate the details around animal contact and types of interaction, (2) assess the association between self-reported unusual symptoms (i.e., any illness or sickness that is not known or recognized in the community or diagnosed by medical providers) and animal contact activities and (3) identify the potential risk factors including behavioral practices of self-reported illness. Participants were enrolled at two community sites: Hpa-An and Hmawbi in Southern Myanmar. A behavioral questionnaire was administered to understand participants’ animal exposures, behaviors and self-reported illnesses. From these responses, associations between (1) animal contact activities and self-reported unusual illnesses, and (2) potential risk factors and self-reported unusual illness were tested. Contact with poultry seemed to be very frequent (91.1%) and many participants reported raising, handling and having poultry in their houses as well as slaughtering or being scratched/bitten by them, followed by contact with rodents (57.8%) and swine (17.9%). Compared to participants who did not have any unusual symptoms, participants who had unusual symptoms in the past year were more likely to have sold dead animals (OR = 13.6, 95% CI 6.8–27.2), slaughtered (OR = 2.4, 95% CI 1.7–3.3), raised (OR = 3.4, 95% CI 2.3–5.0) or handled animals (OR = 2.1, 95% CI 1.2–3.6), and had eaten sick (OR = 4.4, 95% CI 3.0–6.4) and/or dead animals (OR = 6.0, 95% CI 4.1–8.8) in the same year. Odds of having reported unusual symptoms was higher among those involved in animal production business (OR = 3.4, 95% CI 1.9–6.2) and animal-involved livelihoods (OR = 3.3, 95% CI 1.5–7.2) compared to other livelihoods. The results suggest that there is a high level of interaction between humans, livestock and wild animals in communities we investigated in Myanmar. The study highlights the specific high-risk behaviors as they relate to animal contact and demographic risk factors for zoonotic spillover. Our findings contribute to human behavioral data needed to develop targeted interventions to prevent zoonotic disease transmission at human–animal interfaces. Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at 10.1007/s10393-023-01636-9.

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Surveillance of influenza A virus subtype H5N1 in a live bird market in Yangon, Myanmar: 2017–2018

Cited by 6 publications

References 35 publications

Longitudinal Analysis of Influenza A(H5) Sero-Surveillance in Myanmar Ducks, 2006–2019

Longitudinal Analysis of Influenza A(H5) Sero-Surveillance in Myanmar Ducks, 2006–2019

Avian influenza overview February – May 2020

Assessing Behavioral Risk Factors Driving Zoonotic Spillover Among High-risk Populations in Myanmar

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