Surveillance, freedom and the republic

Abstract

Arbitrary state and corporate powers are helping to turn the Internet into a global surveillance dragnet. Responses to this novel form of power have been tepid and ineffective. Liberal critiques of surveillance are constrained by their focus on privacy, security and the underlying presupposition that freedom consists only of freedom from interference. By contrast, (post)Foucauldian critiques rejecting liberalism have been well rewarded analytically, but have proven incapable of addressing normative questions regarding the relationship between surveillance and freedom. Quite apart from these debates, neorepublicans have excavated a third concept of freedom, understood as non-domination. Could neorepublicanism overcome the limitations of liberal and (post)Foucauldian critiques of surveillance? We argue, positively, that neorepublicanism can accommodate much of the (post)Foucauldian analyses while also incorporating a normative critique of surveillance vis-à-vis freedom. We further argue, negatively, that surveillance power has outstripped the capacities of traditional republican institutional responses to domination. We conclude by considering ways in which neorepublicanism can be recalibrated to address the novelty of surveillance power while adhering to the ideal of non-domination. Two ways of addressing the problem are proposed: an offensive, dedicated surveillance antipower and a defensive republican amplification of privacy.

The psychology of privacy in the digital age

“…People need control over their transactions with others (to varying degrees) to experience the well‐being that is associated with intimacy and emotional release (Westin, ). Moreover, privacy is needed for the protection of freedom of speech, freedom of association (Bloustein, ), and freedom from inequality and domination (Anthony, Campos‐Castillo, & Horne, ; Hoye & Monaghan, ). Others have argued that privacy is not based on control, but more specifically that privacy is only achieved when one has limited access to themselves (Dienlin, ).…”

The Ethics of Algorithmic Outsourcing in Everyday Life

“…Recently, some scholars have argued that in making use of algorithmic tools we may be letting algorithmic masters into our lives. Hoye and Monaghan (2015) and Graf (2017), for instance, both argue that the systems of mass surveillance and big data analytics that undergird modern AI tools are domination-facilitating. The idea they share is that by welcoming such tools into our lives we facilitate the construction of a digital panopticon around our activities.…”

Freiheit in datafizierten Kontexten?

“…Der Fokus wird hier gerade von der "strukturelle[n] Eigenlogik digitaler Technik" (ebd., S. 178), die die republikanischen Ideen von Freiheit und politischem Handeln unterminiert, abgewendet und auf das Zusammenspiel von Affordanz und gesellschaftlichen Praktiken gerichtet. In einer explizit neorepublikanischen Perspektive diskutieren Hoye und Monaghan (2018) zwar die Möglichkeit einer Macht wider digitale Überwachung. Aufgrund ihres zentralen, Pettit entlehnten Konzepts der non-domination (Pettit 1997) tendieren sie jedoch zum einen dazu, das genuin republikanische Moment politischer Freiheit nicht zu berücksichtigen.…”